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Abstract
Professional objectors are attorneys who, on behalf of nonnamed class members, file
specious objections to class action settlements and threaten to file frivolous appeals of
district court approvals merely to extract a payoff. Their behavior amounts to a kind of
lawful extortion. By contrast, counsel may submit legitimate objections and appeal in good
faith, which is conduct that helps police the settlement process. The policy challenge is to
suppress extortionate behavior without deterring beneficial conduct. The solutions that have
been tried or proposed are flawed. We propose amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure that would, in effect, require objectors to post appeal bonds in amounts greater
than most circuit courts believe are now legally permissible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsel agree to settle a
federal class action, subject to approval of the district court, any
member of the class may object.1 If the district court approves the
settlement the objector may appeal. Appeals take time, and time is
money—class counsel and, often, nonobjecting class members incur
costs during the pendency of the appeal because attorneys’ fees
typically are not payable and settlements are not implemented until
the legal process has run its course. The prospect of financial loss
A. Robert Noll Distinguished Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University,
Dickinson School of Law.
** Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Adjunct
Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law. We thank
Richard Posner and Robert Wood for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1).

866

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:865

caused by delay in implementation of a class settlement has given
rise to a cottage industry of so-called professional objectors: attorneys
who oppose settlements on behalf of nonnamed class members and
threaten to file meritless appeals of the final judgment merely to
extract a payoff.2 Class counsel have a strong incentive to pay them
to withdraw their appeal and thereby avoid the cost of delay.3 That
payment represents a kind of tax on class action settlements.4 In a
2. In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD01998, 2010 WL 3328249, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 24, 2010); see also In re Cathode Ray Tube
(CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. CV-07-5944-SC, 2012 WL 1319881, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16,
2012) (describing as “a ‘professional’ or ‘serial’ objector” an attorney who “routinely
represents objectors purporting to challenge class action settlements, and does not do so to
effectuate changes to settlements, but does so for his own personal financial gain”); In re
Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 09-MD-2036-JLK, 2011 WL 5873389, at *24 n.30
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2011) (observing that the sole purpose of “professional objectors” is “to
obtain a fee by objecting to whatever aspects of the Settlement they can latch onto” and
that they “are motivated by things other than a concern for the welfare of the Settlement
Class”); Trombley v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 08-cv-456-JD, 2011 WL 3740488, at *5 (D.R.I.
Aug. 24, 2011) (characterizing “professional objectors” as those “who assert meritless
objections in large class action settlement proceedings to extort fees or other payments”); In
re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. MDL 08-1999, 2010
WL 4630846, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2010) (describing “professional objectors” as
“attorneys who specialize in objecting to large class-action settlements”); Gemelas v.
Dannon Co., No. 1:08 CV 236, 2010 WL 3703811, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2010)
(“[Objector] appears to be making a business of objecting to, and appealing, class action
settlements in order to obtain some financial reward.”); Snell v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N.
America, No. Civ. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 1336640, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2000)
(describing class counsel’s characterization of “professional objectors” as “a pariah to the
functionality of class action lawsuits, as they maraud proposed settlements—not to assess
their merits on some principled basis—but in order to extort the parties, and particularly
the settling defendants, into ransoming a settlement that could otherwise be undermined
by a time-consuming appeals process”). One court equivalently characterized professional
objectors as attorneys who “have a pattern or practice of objecting to class action
settlements for the purpose of securing a settlement from class counsel.” In re Initial Pub.
Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Professional objectors on
occasion may themselves be class members. See, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., No. 04md-15863, 2011 WL 1102999, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2011) (noting that professional
objector “has objected or represented objectors in at least six other class actions”). However,
we are aware of no situation in which an attorney has engaged in the kind of repeat
behavior that is characteristic of professional objectors without usually representing class
members. The definition of professional objectors might be expanded to include attorneys
who raise meritless objections to settlements in the district court merely to extort payoffs.
See, e.g., Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that lawyers who
intervene at the district court in a class action settlement process “not to increase the value
of the settlement, but in order to get paid to go away,” could be called professional
objectors). We use a narrower definition. Unless objections are made in the shadow of a
threat to appeal, frivolous objections are not likely to impose a substantial social cost. See
infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
3. Defendants, too, may have an interest in terminating litigation expeditiously, and
they may also attempt to thwart professional objectors. But the interests of defendants in
expedition are different from those of class counsel, see infra notes 99-100 and
accompanying text, and we therefore focus on the bargain struck between objectors and
class counsel.
4. Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072,
at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (“[P]rofessional objectors can levy what is effectively a tax on
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nutshell, professional objectors profit by extorting payments from
class counsel.5 They “can make a living simply by filing frivolous
appeals and thereby slowing down the execution of settlements.”6 Not
surprisingly, they are unpopular, “perhaps the least popular parties
in the history of civil procedure.”7 A judge has observed that
“[f]ederal courts are increasingly weary of professional objectors.”8
The foundation of this cottage industry is the collective nature of
class actions when used to aggregate small claims and the desire to
address the divergent interests of claimants and class counsel. When
each plaintiff’s stake in the outcome of litigation is small, no plaintiff
has an appreciable incentive to monitor the conduct of class counsel.
Class counsel have an incentive to seek a settlement that maximizes
attorneys’ fees at the expense of class compensation, and defendants
have an incentive to accept such a settlement to end the litigation.9
This well-known dynamic has prompted Congress and the
Supreme Court to design procedural measures intended to protect
the class from overreaching by its lawyers. First, in the most common
form of class action and the one analyzed in this Article,10 class
class action settlements, a tax that has no benefit to anyone other than to the objectors.”);
see also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 2011 WL 5873389, at *24 n.30 (agreeing
with the court’s characterization in Barnes).
5. We use the term extortion and its cognates in a nontechnical sense to mean “the
act of wresting money from a person by threat or misuse of authority.” See NEW OXFORD
AM. DICTIONARY 613 (3d ed. 2010). For an example of this use of the term in the relevant
context, see In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 520 n.12 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
(repeating class counsels’ characterization of the efforts of professional objectors “as
nothing short of ‘an attempt at legalized extortion in the guise of an objection’ ”). See also
In re Initial Pub. Offering, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (“[P]rofessional objectors undermine the
administration of justice by disrupting settlement in the hopes of extorting a greater share
of the settlement for themselves and their clients.”). Similarly, we use the term blackmail
as a synonym, to mean “the act of coercing someone to do something by threat.” See NEW
OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY 176 (3d ed. 2010); see also Vollmer, 350 F.3d at 660 (“In the
context of intervening in a class action settlement, extortion would mean intervening not to
increase the value of the settlement, but in order to get paid to go away.”).
6. Barnes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3.
7. Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness
Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 472 (2003).
8. O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 2003);
see also Trombley v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 08-cv-456-JD, 2011 WL 3740488, at *5
(D.R.I. Aug. 24, 2011) (“Courts have recognized the problems caused by so-called
professional objectors . . . .”).
9. See, e.g., In re Pet Foods Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 359 (3d Cir. 2010)
(Weis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the court has “observed on
a number of occasions” that class action defendants are “interested primarily in ‘buying
peace’ ”). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000) [hereinafter
Coffee, Class Action Accountability]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1987).
10. Although we focus on Rule 23(b)(3) class actions brought to obtain damages, much
of our analysis is applicable to the other two types of class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P.
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members must be informed that they can opt out of the action,
potentially twice,11 thereby avoiding any conclusive effect of a
settlement. Second, a district court is obliged to examine the
proposed settlement critically, allowing any class member to oppose
it,12 and conduct a hearing,13 a process intended to provide the court
with information and argument relevant to the court’s decision. A
court may approve the settlement only if it is “fair, reasonable, and
adequate.”14 For its part, the Supreme Court has held that an
objecting nonnamed class member is a “party” to the action and
therefore has a right to appeal a final judgment approving a
settlement.15 It is this broad right of appeal that enables a
professional objector to find nonnamed class members willing to lend
their names to a dubious objection and a meritless appeal in the
expectation that class counsel will pay a handsome sum to make the
complainants go away.16 The professional objector typically does not
anticipate prosecuting the appeal to a judicial decision; if class
counsel unexpectedly fail to pony up, she can withdraw the appeal.
If the law were unconcerned with the legitimate interests of class
members, suppressing professional objectors would be easy. The right
to appeal the approval of a settlement could be limited to named
parties. But these interests are important, and even if denying
23(b)(1)–(2). All that is necessary for a professional objector to engage successfully in
extortion is that a class settlement provide for class counsel attorneys’ fees that are
delayed or placed in jeopardy by an appeal. That condition will almost always be satisfied
even if the class receives only injunctive relief.
11. If a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the typical method by which plaintiffs
aggregate small claims and sue for damages, before a settlement is reached, notice must be
provided to class members that they will be excluded from the class upon request. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). If the parties reach a settlement after class certification, the court
may refuse to approve it unless it affords a new opportunity for class members to request
exclusion. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4). If a class is certified for settlement purposes, therefore,
the class members would receive a single notice of their ability to opt out.
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5).
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
14. Id.
15. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). Devlin involved an action brought
under Rule 23(b)(1), which does not afford class members the ability to opt out of a
settlement. This fact was of some importance to the Court, see id. at 10, and therefore one
cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that the Court would have denied nonnamed
members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, who do have the ability to opt out, the right to appeal.
But the ability to opt out was a subsidiary reason for the Court’s result, and therefore the
case stands for the proposition that nonnamed members of a class certified under any
provision of the Federal Rules who object to a settlement have a right to appeal a judgment
approving it.
16. See generally In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 786513, at *1 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2010) (resisting the term
“professional objectors” but finding that “[o]bjectors’ counsel have a documented history of
filing notices of appeal from orders approving other class action settlements, and thereafter
dismissing said appeals when they and their clients were compensated by the settling class
or counsel for the settling class”).
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nonnamed class members the right to appeal is the best policy, it is
not obviously so. Interlopers may object to a settlement because it
favors class counsel at the expense of the class, and they may pursue
an appeal when the district court mistakenly approves it.17
Sometimes they are vindicated.18
Legitimate objectors are valuable, therefore, though their value
should not be overstated. Objectors may not have access to
substantially more information than a district court, and to that
extent, their contribution to the court’s deliberative process would be
limited. The approach advocated in this Article would not impede the
submission of objections to a district court but would instead
potentially inhibit appeals. It may, therefore, result in a higher rate
of uncorrected analytical errors by the district court. But it will not
reduce the amount of information available to the district court or, in
cases that are appealed, the appellate court. Judicial decisions based
on incomplete information may very well be incorrect, but any
procedural mechanism that restricts appeals by objectors does not
reduce the amount of information available to a court.
The ideal approach to class settlement objections would, at zero
administrative cost, eliminate all extortionate appeals without
deterring any legitimate appeal. Courts and others have proposed a
number of methods for dealing with professional objectors, and every
one of them is flawed.19 For example, the law might prohibit
nonnamed members of opt-out classes, or even all classes, from
appealing an approved settlement, on the grounds that the attendant
costs imposed on legitimate objectors are less than the benefit of
17. See In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 629 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2011)
(noting the important role played by “interlopers who oppose a proposed settlement . . . in
preventing cozy deals that favor class lawyers and defendants at the expense of class
members”); Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that
intervention to “rais[e] the value of a class action settlement” is “entirely proper”).
18. See, e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2010)
(reversing approval of settlement where the record did not demonstrate “that the
settlement will benefit the class in any way”); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d
277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing settlement approval where the district “judge did not
give the issue of the settlement’s adequacy the care that it deserved”); In re Telectronics
Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 873 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing approval where district court
relied on decision subsequently reversed by Supreme Court).
19. Although the problem of professional objectors has not been extensively discussed
in the literature, it is noted and explored in some depth in the following: Nicholas
Barnhorst, How Many Kicks At the Cat?: Multiple Settlement Protests By Class Members
Who Have Refused to Opt Out, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 107 (2005); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The
End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (2009); Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping
the Flies out of the Ointment: Restricting Objectors to Class Action Settlements, 84 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 949 (2010); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be
Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 155 (2001); Geoffrey P. Miller &
Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 120
n.64 (1997); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 571, 618 (1997); and Brunet, supra note 7.
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suppressing hold-ups.20 The law could require nonnamed class
members to intervene in the action at the district court level as a
condition of pursuing an appeal,21 a position once advanced by the
Department of Justice.22 District courts have allowed class counsel to
take, or have themselves initiated, discovery into the behavior of
attorneys suspected of being professional objectors, the class status of
their clients, and the arrangements between them; courts could
impose sanctions if unethical or otherwise improper conduct were
found.23 The appellate court might be required to screen appeals,
dismissing quickly those clearly lacking in merit. They might be
allowed to impose penalties for groundless objections, perhaps at
amounts far larger than are now generally imposed for frivolous
appeals.24 A recent innovation is the use in settlement agreements of
“quick-pay” provisions, which require the defendants to pay plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees upon approval of the settlement by the district court,
regardless of any appeal; the idea is that because plaintiffs’ counsel
will not incur serious costs of delay during the pendency of an appeal,
they will not pay objectors to drop their appeal, and objectors will
therefore have no incentive to appeal.25
Each of these mechanisms misses the mark because it does not
eradicate extortionate behavior, suppresses legitimate behavior, or
entails excessive administrative costs. In a recent article, Brian
Fitzpatrick proposes an innovative method that he asserts is “a
complete solution to the blackmail problem”26: an inalienability rule
prohibiting objectors from settling their appeals.27 He argues that if a
professional objector cannot sell her right to appeal, the objector will
have no incentive to file the appeal, whereas legitimate objectors and
their attorneys will not be deterred because their intent is to secure a
favorable appellate decision.28 Though the proposal is creative, we
believe that it is flawed. The extortion that is the business of
professional objectors can be successfully undertaken before the right
vests. Moreover, Fitzpatrick would allow appeals once undertaken to
be abandoned, but he would rely on a court of appeals to insure that
20. See, e.g., Barnhorst, supra note 19, at 109 (“[F]ailure to opt out of a class, either
prior to settlement or at the settlement stage, should, in the interests of efficiency and
equity, foreclose the opportunity to appeal a district court’s settlement approval.”).
21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (defining the procedural device of intervention).
22. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 11 (2002).
23. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294-95
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
24. See FED. R. APP. P. 38 (permitting an appellate court to “award just damages and
single or double costs” for frivolous appeals).
25. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 19, at 1641.
26. Id. at 1627.
27. Id. at 1659.
28. Id. at 1662.
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the appellant is not being paid off to withdraw the appeal.29 We are
skeptical that appellate courts are institutionally equipped to police
what are in substance side payments.
We favor a significant modification of an approach now in use.
District courts sometimes impose appeal bonds on objectors,30 but the
amount of the bond is tightly constrained. Some circuits hold that
bonds are limited to the relatively trivial costs identified in the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and a federal appellate cost
statute.31 Other circuits hold that bonds are constrained by any
statute underlying the cause of action. Depending on that statute,
courts have held that the bond may or may not reflect the attorneys’
fees of class counsel on appeal32 or the cost of delay in final resolution
of the case.33 One circuit allows bonds that include attorneys’ fees if
authorized by the underlying statute,34 but it also allows bonds in
29. Id. at 1664.
30. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 7 (authorizing district court to require an appellant to file
a bond to ensure payment of costs on appeal); In re Enfamil Lipil Mktg. & Sales Practices
Litig., No. 11-MD-02222, 2012 WL 1189763, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2012) (requiring
settlement objector to post appeal bond); Gemelas v. Dannon Co., No. 1:08CV236, 2010 WL
3703811, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2010) (same); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728
F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same); In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices
Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 786513, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2010) (same);
Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, at *9-10 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 21, 2008) (same); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Cv.
5575(SWK), 2007 WL 2741033, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007) (same); Barnes v.
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. C.A. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *8 (D.
Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (same); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust
Litig., No. MDL 1361, 2003 WL 22417252, at *2 (D. Me. Oct. 7, 2003) (same).
31. See Hirschensohn v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. 96-7312, 1997 WL 307777, at *1
(3d Cir. June 10, 1997) (holding that appeal bonds are limited to costs specified in Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 39); In re Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“The costs referred to [in Rule 7] . . . are simply those that may be
taxed against an unsuccessful litigant under Federal Appellate Rule 39 . . . .”).
32. See, e.g., Azizian v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the “costs on appeal” that may be included in an appeal bond under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 7 include attorneys’ fees permitted by the applicable feeshifting statute); Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 CV 10035(HB), 2011 WL
5873383, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011) (holding that district courts in the Second Circuit
may include attorneys’ fees in an appeal bond when authorized by the substantive statute
but not merely because the court deems the appeal frivolous); Cobell v. Salazar, Civ. No.
96-01285(TFH), 2011 WL 4590776, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2011) (noting that in the D.C.
Circuit, an appeal bond is limited to the costs taxable pursuant to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 39 “as well as attorneys’ fees to the extent an underlying statute
deems such fees to be ‘costs’ ”); In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2010 WL 5147222, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 13, 2010) (“An appeal
bond may only include attorneys’ fees as costs where an underlying statute in the case
contains a fee shifting provision.”).
33. See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 (holding that
“costs incident to delay” may be included in an appeal bond only if included in the
definition of “costs” contained in the underlying statute).
34. See Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit, 420 F. App’x 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding
that an appeal bond may include attorneys’ fees where the underlying statute treats them
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amounts unconstrained by rule or statute where the appeal is
frivolous.35 Appeal bonds, therefore, can be insubstantial. District
courts should be permitted in all cases to impose appeal bonds on
nonnamed class member objectors that reflect the full expected cost
of appeal, including attorneys’ fees and the cost of delay incurred by
class members and their attorneys. A court would presumptively
require a bond in the full amount but would have discretion to reduce
the amount when it concludes that the appeal is legitimate and the
appellant is financially unable to post a bond in the full amount.
We make no claim that our approach is ideal, but we see no
perfect approach. Rather, our approach offers the greatest net value
among a set of imperfect alternatives. Though bonds correctly set and
routinely imposed will predictably deter most frivolous appeals, they
may deter legitimate appeals as well. The principal danger,
therefore, is that the bond approach to extortionate behavior will
produce false positives. A court’s discretion to reduce the amount of
the bond required of legitimate objectors creates a risk that the court
will mistakenly refrain from requiring a full bond from professional
objectors, a false negative, but that risk seems small. The real danger
is that district courts will be biased in favor of ending the litigation
and for that reason impose a bond that will effectively quash
legitimate appeals.
That possibility cannot be dismissed, but for several reasons the
expected cost of the error may be modest. First, the strongest
legitimate appeals will not be deterred by a bond requirement, and
given the scope of review, the number of erroneous decisions that
would have been corrected on appeal is likely to be small. Second, the
experience of one of us (Smith) in the federal judiciary is that district
judges are generally conscientious in performing their function, even
when being so does not further their narrow self-interest in clearing
their dockets. Third, courts now occasionally refuse to require appeal
bonds of attorneys believed to be professional objectors because their
appeals happen to raise legitimate issues.36 Finally, experience with
existing procedural mechanisms that call upon a district court to
assess the propriety of an appeal as a predicate to obtaining

as costs and therefore not reaching issue of whether bond may include them where appeal
is frivolous).
35. See Sckolnick v. Harlow, 820 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that an appeal
bond could include attorneys’ fees where district court found that appeal might
be frivolous).
36. See, e.g., In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,
MDL No. 08-1999, 2010 WL 4630846, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2010) (refusing to require
attorneys assumed to be professional objectors to post appeal bonds where “there are
legitimate issues to pursue on appeal”).
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appellate review is encouraging.37 Our approach can be likened to one
under which objectors are precluded from appealing the approval of a
class action settlement unless the district court certifies the case for
appellate review. The bond approach is preferable, because it is less
radical legally than the certification approach and somewhat less
preclusive in effect. The certification alternative, however, resembles
the current mechanism for interlocutory appellate review.38
Experience with the certification mechanism is instructive. The
two certification contexts differ: failure of the court to certify a case
at an interlocutory stage merely postpones a party’s right of appeal,
whereas under the approach pertaining to class action settlements,
failure to certify precludes appeal. Nevertheless, many of the
incentives that arguably incline a district court to snuff out appeals
of class settlements are at work when a court is asked to permit
interlocutory appeal in a civil case or issue a certificate of
appealability in a habeas case, and district courts do certify these
cases. Indeed, similar incentives would seem to incline district courts
to refuse to issue certificates of appealability from certain habeas
corpus decisions,39 and courts issue these certificates as well.
The possibility that legitimate appeals will be stifled is, therefore,
the principal cost of the proposal. Whatever that cost is, the risk of
error is mitigated somewhat by the ability of appellate courts to
exercise their mandamus power to override the district court’s
decision and order the court to reduce a bond.40 Mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy,41 however, and it therefore only mitigates the
risk of overbreadth. Some legitimate appeals would likely be deterred.
Whether professional objectors are truly a problem depends on the
value of the activity they disrupt. An irony in condemning their
behavior as extortionate is that the conduct of class action lawyers in
some cases can also be described as extortionate. A class action can
be brought with little hope of success on the merits and merely to
extract a settlement from defendants, who have a powerful interest
in avoiding the costs of litigation and face even a tiny probability of
an enormous judgment.42 Few would have sympathy for extortionists
37. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (authorizing interlocutory appeal upon certification
by district court).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2006) (requiring a district or circuit judge to issue a
certificate of appealability as a condition of appeal).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
41. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1989) (recognizing that the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus may be used by appellate court to address clear abuse
of discretion by district court).
42. See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail”
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1391-92,
1402-04 (2000).
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held up by other extortionists, and a public interest justification for
incurring any cost to eradicate professional objectors would be hard
to find.43 But surely many class actions serve a valuable function in
achieving the economies of scale necessary to bring a civil case
against wrongdoers and thereby deter violations of law.44
Professional objectors are indiscriminate. Those who file frivolous
objections tax the extortionate class action as well as the productive
one, and it is the tax on the latter that justifies measures to suppress
their conduct.
We proceed as follows: In Part II, we outline the problem posed by
professional objectors. We explain why professional objectors can
succeed in an extortionate strategy and why their conduct is
inefficient. In Part III, we analyze several methods that might be
used to address their conduct. In Part IV, we survey the law on
appeal bonds and detail our proposal. We conclude in Part V.
II. UNDERSTANDING PROFESSIONAL OBJECTORS
A “professional objector” can be loosely defined as an attorney who
on behalf of one or more nonnamed class members routinely submits
unsuccessful objections to settlements and threatens to file
insubstantial appeals of settlement approvals merely to obtain
payoffs from class counsel.45 Though the definition is analytically
43. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[C]lass actions create the opportunity for a kind of
legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might use the threat of a large
class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a settlement far in excess of
the individual claims’ actual worth.”); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price
Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197, 218 n.52 (D. Me. 2003) (“[T]he class action device
promotes the filing of spurious lawsuits forcing defendants to pay only in order to avoid the
high expenses of class action litigation.”).
44. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 785 (8th ed. 2011);
Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective
Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 563 (1996); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8-9
(1991); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of
the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 720-25 (2006); Hay & Rosenberg,
supra note 42, at 1383-89.
45. One district court cited approvingly the following description of the behavior of
professional objectors:
‘[T]he unfortunate game is to lodge pro forma objections at the trial
stage, then negotiate a private resolution in order to drop the invariable
notice of appeal. Once the case has progressed beyond the trial court,
there is no longer any accountability for side payments to objectors’
counsel, and the game is on.’
In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 09-MD-02036-JLK, 2011 WL 5873389, at *24
n.30 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2011) (quoting declaration of Prof. Samuel Issacharoff). We
deliberately exclude from this definition and our analysis counsel for named class members
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useful, it is problematic as a legal standard to the extent it depends
on motivation.46 Judges are reluctant to ascribe improper motives to
objectors when negative consequences flow from such a
determination.47 Some objective measure of intent is helpful in
identifying the kind of objector that should be deterred, and the best
one is the objective probability that an objection will ultimately
succeed on the merits. Professional objectors typically file objections
irrespective of merit and that have a low probability of success, a
principle that accords with intuitive notions of extortionate behavior.
A lawyer who specializes in disrupting class action settlements may
on occasion hit upon a valid objection—one with a high probability of
success. Whether the lawyer is called a professional objector is not
important. All that is important is that the conduct in the exceptional
case not be deterred. That is the policy objective explored in this
Article. A critical variable in identifying extortionate conduct, then, is
the objective probability of legal success. But that is only one variable.
Broadly speaking, the point of an objection should be to obtain
greater compensation for at least some members of the class than the
settlement provides. A settlement may be deficient for three principal
reasons. First, the total amount of the settlement fund may be
inadequate. Second, the attorneys’ fees may represent an undue
who disagree with a settlement acceptable to other class counsel. Intra-class counsel
disputes potentially raise issues that arise in professional objector appeals, but they are
more likely to result in legitimate appeals, and they are not the focus of this Article.
Indeed, appeals by named class representatives serve as a useful check on settlements that
promote the interests of defendants and class counsel at the expense of the class, given
that the proposal outlined in this Article may suppress some legitimate appeals by
nonnamed class members.
46. Two commentators observe, “While it is possible that the motivations of a
particular objector’s counsel could be mixed or unclear, most practitioners would agree that
the term ‘professional objector’ is susceptible to the same ‘I know it when I see it’ standard
as Justice Potter Stewart’s standard for identifying obscenity.” Paul Karlsgodt & Raj
Chohan, Class Action Settlement Objectors: Minor Nuisance or Serious Threat to Final
Approval?, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA), Aug. 12, 2011 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). The authors define professional objectors as
“attorneys who solicit members of a class in order to raise objections to a class settlement,
in the hopes of extracting a portion of the fee or taking over as class counsel.” Id.
47. See, e.g., In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,
MDL No. 08-1999, 2010 WL 4630846, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2010) (finding that though
“the objectors’ true motives [might be] to obstruct the settlement in the hopes of ‘getting
paid to go away,’ . . . the evidence in the record does not enable me to find that any objector
is pursuing his or her appeal for an improper purpose”) (quoting Vollmer v. Selden, 350
F.3d 656, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2003)); In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06MD-1775 (JG)(VVP), 2010 WL 1049269, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010) (concluding that
evidence of “bad faith or vexatious conduct” in other similar litigations was insufficient to
support a finding of such conduct in instant litigation); Snell v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N.
Am., No. Civ. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 1336640, at *9-10 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2000)
(acknowledging concern that objectors’ lawyers might be marauding proposed settlements
to extort the parties, but finding that the record did not demonstrate “a pressing need for
our preservation of the Court processes”).
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proportion of the fund, so that lower attorneys’ fees would result in
greater compensation to the class as a whole.48 Third, some members
of the class may deserve a larger share of the fund than the
settlement specifies. This last objection raises an intraclass
distributional issue, not an issue of total compensation to the class.
The monetary value of the objection is the benefit to the complaining
group, even if other members of the class would suffer an offsetting
loss.49 An identifiable group within a class has no legal obligation to
subsidize other class members. A variant of this objection is that the
class contains members with conflicting interests and was therefore
improperly defined;50 properly defined classes would have produced a
different settlement, one that favored some group, though the
amount of the incremental benefit cannot be estimated in advance of
settlement negotiations. This structural objection has the same
implication as one that pertains directly to the distribution of the
settlement among class members: the settlement reflects a loss to a
group within the class. In all three major categories, at least some
group within the class would benefit if the objection were sustained.51
One way to begin to distinguish between legitimate and
extortionate appeals is to compare the appellant’s cost of appeal to
the expected monetary value of a successful resolution by the
48. A settlement might provide for attorneys’ fees separate from the fund used to
compensate class members. Objectors might sensibly contend, however, that the
compensatory fund would have been larger if attorneys’ fees had been lower. But see Perez
v. Asurion Corp., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D1047, D1050 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting that class
counsel’s fees were not being paid out of funds designated for class recovery and “[t]hus,
there is no reduction in the Class members’ recovery to pay the lawyers”).
49. A subcategory of the third objection is that the settlement provides for excessive
incentive awards to class representatives. See, e.g., Dewey v. Volkswagen of America, 728
F. Supp. 2d 546, 577-78 (D.N.J. 2010) (rejecting objection that $10,000 incentive awards
were excessive in part because the payments did not diminish the money available to the
class). The import of this objection is that nonnamed class members suffer a disadvantage
relative to class representatives under the settlement to the extent that total class
compensation is fixed.
50. When a class contains members with divergent interests, the class fails the
requirement for certification that representative class members “will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). See Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-27 (1997) (concluding that certification of a settlement class
was improper for want of adequate representation where the interests of those within the
class were not aligned). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(5) permits a class to be
subdivided into subclasses when a single class contains members with antagonistic
interests. See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 271 (3d Cir. 2009).
51. Objectors might make other challenges. For example, they might complain about
the disposition of unclaimed funds. If the argument is that unclaimed funds should not
revert to the defendants as a way of preserving the deterrent effect of the settlement, the
objection would not necessarily imply any monetary benefit for members of the class. For
example, a cy pres distribution would prevent reversion but would not provide value to the
class. By contrast, objectors might seek a residual distribution that did directly benefit the
class. Under our definition, the first kind of objection would represent a zero monetary
value to the class, and the second would reflect a positive value.
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appellate court to the class members on whose behalf the appeal is
filed.52 A legitimate appeal, as we use the term, will always have a
positive expected monetary value. For example, an appeal that would
cost the appellant $2000 to prosecute and has a 10% probability of
resulting in an appellate decision awarding the class an additional
$50,000 has a positive expected monetary value of $3000. An
extortionate appeal, by contrast, may have either a positive or a
negative expected monetary value. Such an appeal may be brought
not to obtain a judicial decision but to obtain a payoff, even when the
appeal has a positive expected monetary value.53 A positive expected
monetary value, therefore, is a necessary but not sufficient condition
of a legitimate appeal, and it is calculated by reference to the value to
class members, not the value to their attorney. Professional objectors,
like class counsel, pose an agency problem. The lawyer’s interests
diverge from those of her clients. Successful appeals will likely result
in attorneys’ fees that are some fraction of the benefits secured for
class members. But the legitimacy of the appeal depends upon the
benefits that are sought for the principals rather than their agent.
As the above example suggests, an appeal may have a negative
expected monetary value—a characteristic of an extortionate
appeal—even when the probability of a favorable judicial resolution
is positive. The expected monetary value is a net determination that
depends on the costs of appeal. Change the costs of appeal in the
example to $6000 and the expected monetary value of the appeal is
negative $1000. These costs consist of both the direct costs of
appeal incurred by the attorney representing objecting class
members on appeal and the costs of delay in implementing the
settlement incurred by class members who stand to gain by a
successful appeal; they do not include the appellate costs of counsel
defending the settlement.
To understand the motivation and success of professional
objectors, one must focus on their private incentives, not the interests
of the class members they represent. In general, professional
objectors can succeed because the costs they incur in an appeal are

52. The implication of our definition is that an appeal taken in a quixotic but sincere
attempt to win a favorable resolution, one that might require a change in the law, for
instance, would likely be illegitimate. Such an appeal is not the kind of appeal pursued by
professional objectors. But we use the term “legitimate” in this Article only for convenience,
and the fact that it does not precisely capture the difference between appeals brought by
professional objectors and those brought by others is not important to our analysis.
Besides, the number of sincere but illegitimate appeals is likely to be very small.
53. Cf. Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that a
nonfrivolous claim might nevertheless be brought for the extortionate purpose of causing
delay “in the hope of getting paid” to go away).

878

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:865

less than the costs class counsel incur.54 In the typical case, the
professional objector threatens to impose a substantial cost on class
counsel.55 Suppose class counsel are concerned only about their
compensation and would receive $1 million in fees under the terms of
the settlement. An appeal delays implementation of the settlement,
including in most cases payment of attorneys’ fees. A one-year delay
during the pendency of appeal at an interest rate of 5% represents a
loss of $50,000 to class counsel. Suppose class counsel incur direct
costs of $10,000 in litigating the appeal. Even if the appeal is certain
to lose, it will cost class counsel $60,000. Class counsel could pay the
professional objector any amount up to $60,000 in exchange for
dropping the appeal and be better off—the maximum amount
declines as the date of appellate resolution approaches because the
cost of delay diminishes. Notice that in this example, the payment
does not reduce the compensation received by the class. Paying off
the professional objector serves the private interests of class counsel
without compromising the interests of the class.
In contrast to the costs that class counsel would incur in an
appeal, the professional objector’s costs of appeal are relatively low.
For one thing, because the objector is not entitled to attorneys’ fees
under the settlement, the objector does not incur a cost of delayed
payment of an obligation. Time in reaching a deal with class counsel
imposes merely an opportunity cost in the use of the payoff. For
another, the professional objector’s appellate litigation fees can be
very low. The objector can base objections on grounds routinely
asserted in opposition to class settlements based on inherently
malleable principles. For example, fees paid to class counsel must be
reasonable,56 but reasonableness is a standard, not a rule, and its

54. For expositional clarity and to reflect actual practice, the analysis in this section
excludes the interests of defendants. Defendants’ interests are more complicated than the
interests of class counsel, though defendants have an interest in defending a settlement
once it is agreed upon. See Karlsgodt & Chohan, supra note 46, at 2 (“The problem of
dealing with professional objectors is customarily the role of plaintiffs’ counsel, although
after having agreed to a settlement, the defendant has just as much of an incentive to
overcome objections as the plaintiffs’ lawyers do.”).
55. For illustrative purposes, this Article focuses on the situation in which a single
professional objector threatens to appeal the approval of a settlement. In reality, several
professional objectors might threaten to appeal. The existence of multiple objectors
complicates the bargaining game. The objectors might collude, or each objector might
pursue a settlement unilaterally. When objectors act unilaterally, each may attempt to
hold out and settle last, for even a single appeal will delay implementation of the class
settlement. The existence of multiple objectors acting unilaterally may delay or even
thwart a settlement with class counsel, and it may increase the total amount paid to the
objectors to withhold or to withdraw their appeals. We do not explore further the
implications of multiple objections.
56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (allowing the court to award “reasonable attorney’s fees”).
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determination is fact specific.57 A professional objector can almost
always assert, ostensibly in good faith, that the attorneys’ fees
awarded in a settlement are excessive. Because many of the
standards for class actions and class settlements are fundamentally
general, objections can be taken off the rack or even made out of
whole cloth.58 Likewise, appellate briefs can be assembled from
ready-made pieces, with little tailoring.59 Broad statements about the
impermissibility of excessive class counsel fees supported by citations
to a few cases can be pasted into nearly any brief challenging a
settlement approval.
When the expected monetary value of the appeal to the objector is
positive, it is easy to see why the parties would reach a bargain. As
noted above, the objector is driven by private interests, not the
interests of the class. Suppose the objector would incur direct
litigation costs of $5000 in pursuing an appeal that if successful
would increase the amount paid to the class by $1,000,000 without
reducing attorneys’ fees. The objector would not be entitled to all of
the attorneys’ fees that might be awarded for securing the increment
on behalf of the class, for the increment is a joint product of the
efforts of class counsel and the objector; the objector would not be
able to obtain an increment unless class counsel obtained the base
amount, and class counsel are entitled to a share of attorneys’ fees

57. See generally MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“A rule singles out one or a few facts and makes it or them conclusive of legal liability; a
standard permits consideration of all or at least most facts that are relevant to the
standard's rationale.”).
58. See, e.g., Taubenfeld v. Aon Corp., 415 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that
an objection failed to “articulate” the objector’s argument challenging attorneys’ fees and
contained “conclusory allegations”); In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., No. 04-md-15863, 2011
WL 1102999, at *1 n.1, *3 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2011) (noting that professional objector “raises
boilerplate objections related to the adequacy of class compensation, the suitability of the
class representative, and the amount of proposed attorneys’ fees”); Gemelas v. Dannon Co.,
No. 1:08 CV 236, 2010 WL 3703811, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2010) (noting that objector
filed “form objections” in two cases “with only minor changes in the headings and
arguments to make them applicable to the defendant” in the second case); In re Initial Pub.
Offering Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 467, 496-97 n.219 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting class
counsels’ assertion that other courts had criticized the objectors’ “canned objections”); In re
UnitedHealth Group Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1109 (D. Minn. 2009)
(describing objector’s pleading as “disingenuous” and observing that it “presented no facts,
offered no law, and raised no argument upon which the Court relied”); In re AOL Time
Warner ERISA Litig., No. 02 Cv. 8853(SWK), 2007 WL 4225486, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
2007) (observing that objection “contained arguments counterproductive to the resolution
of the litigation” and arguments “that were irrelevant or simply incorrect”); In re Royal
Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 383, 386 (D. Md. 2006) (concluding that a
professional objector “provided no coherent explanation for his contention” that class
counsels’ fees were excessive and that the objection “was not well reasoned and was
not helpful”).
59. Cf. Gemelas, 2010 WL 3703811, at *2 (referring to objector’s appeal as a
“form appeal”).
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awarded for the increment.60 Nevertheless, the objector would be
entitled to some fraction of the increment, and suppose the objector
would be awarded 10% of the increment, or $100,000. If the appeal
has a 10% chance of success, the expected monetary value of the
appeal to the objector is $5000 ((.10 x $100,000) – $5000).61 In
bargaining theory terminology, this is the objector’s threat value, or
threat point, the payoff the objector would obtain in the
noncooperative solution.62 Assuming class counsel would make any
payment to the objector from attorneys’ fees and not class
compensation, class counsel would also be pursuing solely their
private interest. If the net expected cost of the appeal to class counsel
is $60,000,63 representing a negative threat value, a payment to the
objector could make both parties better off. Class counsel would be
willing to pay any amount up to $60,000, and the objector would be
willing to accept any amount over $5000. Just what payment
between $5000 and $60,000 class counsel would make, or stated
otherwise, just how the parties would divide the cooperative surplus,
is the stuff of bargaining theory and is not important for present
purposes; one reasonable assumption is that the parties would split
the surplus of $55,000, and class counsel would pay the objector
$32,500. What is important is that a payoff to avoid or end the appeal
is in the mutual economic self-interest of both parties.
But will extortion work when the expected monetary value of the
appeal to the objector is negative? If the objector stands to gain
nothing from an appeal, her threat to file the appeal may not be
credible. Class counsel could simply refuse to pay even if they would
incur substantial costs were the objector to appeal, secure in the
knowledge that the objector will not, in fact, appeal.

60. See In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 629 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2011)
(holding that objecting counsel was not entitled to all attorneys’ fees awarded for
increasing a settlement fund over the amount negotiated by other class counsel).
61. The utility to the objector of the uncertain outcome will depend upon the objector’s
attitude toward risk. For simplicity, we assume that the objector is risk neutral, so that
the objector derives the same utility from an uncertain outcome as from a certain outcome
of equal expected monetary value.
62. For introductions to cooperative game theory and bargaining theory as relevant
here, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 74-76 (6th ed. 2012) and
ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 357-84 (4th ed. 2007).
63. In the scenario posed, the expected monetary value of the appeal to class counsel
is the direct cost of the appeal plus the cost of delay minus the expected gain in attorneys’
fees that would be awarded class counsel on the incremental settlement amount. This is
the threat value of class counsel, and in this example, it is a negative number. Of course,
the objector’s appeal may challenge the amount of the attorneys’ fees stipulated in the
settlement or might otherwise attack the settlement in ways that, if successful, would
reduce the fees or require additional effort by class counsel for no compensation. In that
event, the net expected cost of the appeal would include the value of that expected cost.
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A threat to prosecute an appeal with a negative expected
monetary value might be credible, however, for two reasons: because
the objector will reach a point at which further action is less costly
than the expected value of the appeal; or because the objector derives
value from creating a reputation through repeated behavior. First,
recognize that an appeal may have a negative expected monetary
value even if the probability of success in the appellate court is
positive. An appeal costs something, even if the brief is cobbled
together from stock parts. If the appeal has a very low probability of
success or the attorneys’ fees the objector would be awarded are
insubstantial, the cost of the appeal in the aggregate may exceed the
expected return. But in the language of game theory, all that is
necessary in a single-game setting to make a threat of appellate
litigation credible is that a point will be reached when the objector
can withdraw the appeal and the marginal cost of pursuing it is less
than its expected monetary value.64 At that point, the expected
monetary value of continuing the appeal is positive. And because the
threat is credible at that point, backward induction leads to the
conclusion that the threat to appeal at the outset is credible.65
Normally in appellate litigation, the appellant is required to file a
brief within two months or so of filing the notice of appeal. After that
point, the objector’s cost of appeal is trivial; she may choose not to file
a reply brief, and she may not even be required to participate in oral
argument if the court chooses to dispense with it. But resolution of
the appeal may be months away, and during the interim class
counsel will incur delay costs. A deal during this period can make
both sides better off.
Moreover, the assumption that the appeal has a positive
probability of success implies that the expected cost of the appeal to
class counsel may entail more than the direct cost of litigation and
the cost of delay pending resolution. If the appeal results in an order
that reduces class counsel fees or further delays their receipt,
perhaps by requiring the district court to reconsider or restructure
the settlement, the benefit to class counsel of terminating the
appeal increases, and all else equal, the amount of the payoff to the
objector increases.
The above analysis depends on the assumption that the appeal
has some positive probability of success. An appeal may have an
aggregate expected negative value because it has a zero probability of
success, but even then the threat of an appeal can be credible.

64. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success
of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5-7 (1996).
65. Id.
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Professional objectors file objections serially;66 in game-theoretic
terms, they are repeat players. Taking an action that will impose a
net expected cost on the player himself is not irrational when it
makes threats in other cases credible, for unless a threat is credible,
it can be ignored. This principle applies even if the appellate court
imposes sanctions on the objector under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38 for filing a frivolous appeal, and the assumption that
the appeal objectively has a zero probability of success surely implies
that the appeal is frivolous.67 The effect of sanctions is to raise the
expected cost of the appeal to the objector, but it does not change the
rationality of incurring a cost. In effect, the professional objector
invests in creating a reputation, thereby rendering her threats
credible. Knowing that pursuit of an appeal with a zero probability of
success is nevertheless rational, class counsel may deem the threat to
appeal credible and pay off the objector so long as the appeal would
impose costs on class counsel. The objector’s threat may be credible
even if the objector never actually pursues an appeal.
By contrast, a threat to file a specious objection—or a threat not to
withdraw one—that is not backed up by an explicit or implicit threat
to file an appeal has little extortionate value. Class counsel are not
entitled to fees at least until a settlement is approved. They will
usually incur no cost of delay if the objection is presented to or
remains before the district court. They may incur a marginal cost of
responding to the objection if the objection raises issues that class
counsel would not otherwise have addressed, but this cost is likely to
be modest when the issues are legally trivial. And the essence of
extortionate conduct as it relates to professional objectors is that
their objections are legally insubstantial.
Notice, however, that a well-founded objection by itself may have
bargaining value, but a bargain that keeps such an objection from the
court achieves a socially harmful result. A district court in protecting
the interests of the class has an obligation to consider all issues that
bear upon the fairness of the settlement, even if an issue has not
66. See, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., No. 04-md-15863, 2011 WL 1102999, at *1
n.1 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2011) (noting that objector’s attorney “is a frequent and professional
objector”); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1361,
2003 WL 22417252, at *2 n.3 (D. Me. Oct. 7, 2003) (noting that a settlement objector
proposing to file a possibly frivolous appeal “appears to be a repeat objector in class action
cases”). Indeed, courts sometimes use the term “serial objectors” as synonymous with
professional objectors. See, e.g., In re Charles Schwab Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C 08—01510
WHA, 2011 WL 633308, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011); Gemelas v. Dannon Co., No. 1:08
CV 236, 2010 WL 3703811, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2010); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec.
Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
67. See, e.g., Premier Pork, L.L.C. v. Westin Packaged Meats, Inc., 406 F. App’x 613,
618 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 (3d Cir. 1991)) (“An
appeal is frivolous if, applying an objective standard, it is wholly without merit.”).
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been raised by an objector.68 But as a practical matter, the court
might not see a particular issue unless it is pointed out by an
objector. Indeed, a vexing problem posed by class action settlements
is that, though the judge must approve them, the lawyers control her
access to the information needed to determine their reasonableness.69
Class counsel might incur a substantial expected loss if an objector
raises an otherwise overlooked issue, and that loss would create a
bargaining space. The difference between the issue that underlies the
extortion of the professional objector and the issue that may induce
class counsel to bribe an objector is that the former has little legal
merit and the latter substantial merit.
Interestingly, a threat not to withdraw an objection already filed
has much less value, because the court will have already been alerted
to the issue and is apt to consider it even if the objection is
withdrawn; assuming the threat to maintain the objection is not
coupled with the implicit expectation of appeal, class counsel have
little to gain from paying to have it withdrawn. But in the
circumstance of the latent issue, the issue is by hypothesis legally
important. It should be considered. One could call a threat to notify
the court of an unobserved and legally important weakness in a
settlement a kind of blackmail, but it is not the kind that should be
deterred. Rather, an agreement to pay off the potential objector in
such circumstances would represent punishable collusion.70 To recap,
professional objectors may engage in significant socially harmful
extortion at the objection stage, but only if the prospect of an appeal
lies in the background.
The upshot of this analysis is that a strategy of extortion—a
strategy of threatening to appeal the approval of a class action
settlement solely for the purpose of inducing class counsel to make a
payment to avoid the appeal—is economically rational. It can be
effective, and it can be profitable. This does not mean that every
appeal is so motivated. An interloper may object to a settlement to
68. See generally Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (noting that
the absence or silence of class members toward a settlement does not relieve the judge of
her duty to protect the class), aff’d, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970); 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:48, at 151 (4th ed. 2002) (“Despite a lack of
opposition, the court should not lose sight of its responsibility to analyze independently and
intelligently the settlement.”).
69. See POSNER, supra note 44, at 786.
70. See Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (“While the parties to a
class action start out in an adversarial posture, once they reach the settlement stage,
incentives have shifted and there is the danger of collusion.”); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting the dangers
of “collusive settlements that primarily serve the interests of defendants—by granting
expansive protection from law suits—and of plaintiffs’ counsel—by generating
large fees gladly paid by defendants as a quid pro quo for finally disposing of many
troublesome claims”).
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increase the value to the class,71 and she might appeal because the
district court errs in approving it. Indeed, an objector who provides
some value to the class is entitled to compensation.72 It does mean,
however, that economic theory supports the popular perception that
some attorneys challenging class action settlements are professional
objectors pursuing a strategy of extortion. The legal prerequisite for
the strategy is Devlin v. Scardelletti.73 In that case, a nonnamed
member of a class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(1), who had refused to become a named representative,
formally moved to intervene in the action some two weeks after class
counsel and defendants filed a motion for preliminary approval of a
settlement.74 The district court denied the motion to intervene as
untimely, but it considered the individual’s objections anyway and
approved the settlement.75 The objector appealed the denial of
intervention and the settlement approval.76 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari “to resolve a disagreement among the circuits as to
whether nonnamed class members who fail to properly intervene
may bring an appeal of the approval of a settlement.”77

71. For example, one court explained:
There are two ways . . . an intervenor might get paid. An intervenor
might get paid by raising the value of a class action settlement and
receiving a percentage of the increase in value or a fixed-payment for
having improved the settlement; on the other hand, he might intervene
and cause expensive delay in the hope of getting paid to go away. The
former purpose for intervening would be entirely proper, while the
latter would not.
Vollmer, 350 F.3d at 660; see also In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., No. 00 Civ.
6689(SAS), 2003 WL 22801724, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (citing White v. Auerbach,
500 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1974)) (“[O]bjectors have a valuable and important role to
perform in policing class action settlements.”).
72. See, e.g., White, 500 F.2d at 828; In re AOL Time Warner ERISA Litig., No. 02 Cv.
8853(SWK), 2007 WL 4225486, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2007); Perez v. Asurion Corp., No.
06-20734-CIV, 2007 WL 2591180, at *8 n.5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2007) (awarding objectors’
counsel expenses and fees for attendance at fairness hearing even though court did not find
papers he filed “to be particularly helpful or to have conferred a benefit on the Class” but
found that attendance “provided a safety check for the parties and the Court”). One court,
though denying a fee award to objectors who “contributed nothing,” explained: “Objectors
may add value to the [settlement] process by: (1) transforming the fairness hearing into a
truly adversarial proceeding; (2) supplying the Court with both precedent and argument to
gauge the reasonableness of the settlement and lead counsel’s fee request; and (3)
preventing collusion between lead plaintiff and defendants.” In re UnitedHealth Group Inc.
PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1109 (D. Minn. 2009) (citing In re Cardinal Health,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2008)).
73. 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
74. See id. at 5.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 6.
77. Id.
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The Court reasoned that the issue did not turn on standing.78 As a
member of the class, the petitioner had constitutional standing, and
an appeal did not raise concerns normally addressed as a matter of
prudential standing.79 Rather, the issue was whether such a class
member is a “party” within the meaning of the principle “that ‘only
parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may
appeal an adverse judgment.’ ”80 The Court held that such a class
member is a party.81 What the Court found “most important” was
that nonnamed class members are “bound by the settlement.”82 The
Court explained, “It is this feature of class action litigation that
requires that class members be allowed to appeal the approval of a
settlement when they have objected at the fairness hearing.”83
Because the case involved an action brought under Rule 23(b)(1),
class members did not have the right to opt out of the settlement; by
contrast, members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, which is the kind of action
this Article addresses, do have that right.84 The Court observed:
Particularly in light of the fact that petitioner had no ability to opt
out of the settlement, appealing the approval of the settlement is
petitioner’s only means of protecting himself from being bound by
a disposition of his rights he finds unacceptable and that a
reviewing court might find legally inadequate.85

Curiously, the Court was apparently aware that objectors sometimes
file extortionate objections, for Justice Scalia alluded to the practice
in his dissent.86 But the Court did not acknowledge the effect of its
decision on the practice, view the practice as problematic, or believe
that any exacerbating effect on the problem justified a different
result. Even Justice Scalia seemed to be only partially aware of the
nature of the problem, because his preferred resolution of the case
would not have effectively prevented professional objector extortion.87
That an objector is recognized as a party with a concomitant right
to appeal is critical for the objector to pursue a strategy of extortion.
78. Id. at 6-7.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 7 (quoting Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam)).
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558-59 (2011)
(noting the difference between “mandatory” classes certified under Rules 23(b)(1) and (2)
and opt-out classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3)).
85. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10-11 (citation omitted).
86. See id. at 22 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys.,
Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 973-74 n. 18 (E.D. Tex. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“noting ‘canned objections filed by professional objectors who seek out class actions to
simply extract a fee by lodging generic, unhelpful protests’ ”).
87. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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In theory, however, the right to appeal is otherwise limited in a way
that defeats the strategy. The objection that serves as a necessary
predicate for an appeal is subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, which provides that the attorney submitting any paper to the
court certifies that “it is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.”88 A court may impose sanctions for
violation of Rule 11. Extortion could comfortably be described as an
improper purpose.89 But even if Rule 11 represents a legal constraint
on the behavior of professional objectors, its positive impact depends
on its application: an attorney or the court must initiate a Rule 11
proceeding; the judge must find impropriety; and the judge must
impose a sanction that is an effective deterrent. Professional
objectors have an incentive, and usually the ability, to couch the
objection in ways that disguise their motivation. Moreover, they may
be undaunted by the prospect of modest sanctions, particularly given
the probability that not all instances of extortionate objections will be
found improper. And class counsel may prefer to make the payment
than incur the cost of seeking Rule 11 sanctions.
If an extortionate demand does not violate any procedural rule,
nothing in the Federal Rules now would prohibit class counsel from
acceding to it so long as the payment does not come from funds that
would otherwise be distributed to the class. A class member may
appeal the approval of a settlement only if she objected to the
settlement.90 Class counsel, therefore, could eliminate an appeal by
paying the objector to withdraw an objection prior to the Rule 23
hearing, which the court must conduct to determine whether the
proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”91 Further,
the parties seeking approval must identify “any agreement made in
connection with the proposal,”92 and an agreement to pay off an
objector would qualify. But the fairness standard relates to the
interests of class members, not their lawyers, and the agreementdisclosure requirement is an adjunct to the court’s fairness
determination. An agreement to withdraw the objection in exchange
for a payment that merely reduces class counsels’ fees and does not
reduce compensation would not adversely affect the class.

88. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
89. See, e.g., Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that
attorneys intervening to object to a settlement in the hope of causing expensive delay and
getting paid to go away would be an improper purpose that would justify sanctions).
90. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10 (noting that nonnamed class members are parties to the
case and thus have the right to appeal “when they have objected at the fairness hearing”).
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).
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If the agreement did reduce class compensation, it would implicate
fairness. But eliminating the delay that would attend an appeal
likely would benefit the class by speeding up execution of the
settlement. If simply avoiding the harm an extortionate demand
threatens to impose is not a cognizable benefit to the class, class
counsel can tweak the settlement in a way that ostensibly provides
some cognizable benefits to class members. In that case, the
agreement to pay off the objector does not appear to be merely
capitulation to an extortionate demand. Rule 23 also specifically
requires the court’s approval for the withdrawal of any objection.93
But again, the point of this requirement is to ensure that the
settlement is fair to the class. The court has an independent
responsibility to consider any issue that bears upon the fairness of a
settlement, whether the issue is raised in an objection or not.94 A
court would have to consider the merits of the objection even if it
permitted withdrawal. As long as the payoff and the attendant
agreement to withdraw the objection either did not injure the class or
arguably resulted in net gains to members of the class, the court
could not sensibly refuse to approve the withdrawal. Alternatively,
class counsel and the professional objector might strike a deal under
which the objector does not withdraw her objection but does not
appeal the settlement approval. In that event, nothing in Rule 23
would even apply.
The fact that extortionate behavior is legally possible and
economically rational does not mean that it is socially harmful. The
welfare effects depend on the impact it has on resources and
productive behavior. Imagine that lawyers bring a class action with a
2% probability of a $1 billion judgment, hoping to induce the
defendant to pay a settlement with a substantial component devoted
to attorneys’ fees. The defendant, especially if it is risk averse, may
prefer to settle the case rather than risk its reputation or even its
corporate existence.95 If a professional objector comes forward
threatening to appeal the settlement, any payoff to the objector will
represent a private tax on the extortionate class action. Such a tax
will make objecting less profitable, and because the activity is
socially undesirable, the objector’s conduct may reduce the quantity
of extortionate class actions at the margin.

93. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5) (“Any class member may object to the proposal if it
requires court approval under this subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn only
with the court’s approval.”).
94. See supra note 68.
95. See, e.g., CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th
Cir. 2011) (“Certification as a class action can coerce a defendant into settling on highly
disadvantageous terms regardless of the merits of the suit.”).

888

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:865

If all class actions were extortionate, professional objectors would
be of little concern. Assuming their effect on class actions is
disproportionate to their own costs, they would produce net positive
value. But not all class actions are extortionate. The class action
procedure may be indispensable in holding actors accountable for
legal wrongs, where individual claims are too small to justify
litigation.96 And though the relative proportions of valuable and
extortionate class actions cannot be estimated with any confidence,
presumably the proportion of valuable ones is substantial. The
strategy of extortionate appeals or threats of appeals by professional
objectors is invariant to the nature of the underlying class action. The
strategy imposes a tax on valuable and extortionate class actions alike.
The tax on valuable class actions has undesirable consequences.
Imagine that pirates are known to hijack ships off the coast of
Somalia, holding crews for ransom. A boater might respond by
navigating around the affected waters or by canceling the cruise.
Either response represents a social cost. Class action lawyers are
boaters. At the margin, productive class actions might not be
brought, and if they are brought, they may be litigated and settled in
ways that are needlessly costly, only to reduce the risk of hold-up.
If feasible, the law might prevent professional objectors from
extorting payoffs in valuable class actions but not in extortionate
class actions. But there is no obvious way to do so, and the second
best policy response is to prevent professional objector extortion
entirely. The reason is not so much based on an empirical hunch that
the value of desirable class actions outweighs the value of
extortionate ones. Rather, extortionate class actions can be addressed
in ways that are more direct and more effective than by exposing
them to pirates.
III. METHODS OF SUPPRESSING PROFESSIONAL OBJECTORS
The practical policy objective is not to confine professional
objectors to the realm of extortionate class actions, but to suppress
them altogether. But a real policy challenge exists in devising a
method to deter extortion without deterring legitimate appeals.
Agency problems plague class action litigation. The principals are the
members of the class, but their stakes in the outcome of the litigation
are usually too small to give them an incentive to monitor the
decisions of class counsel. Class counsel have fiduciary obligations to
the class,97 but they have an economic interest in maximizing their
96. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 44, at 785; Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 138389; Macey & Miller, supra note 44, at 8-9.
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (“Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the class.”).
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fees.98 They benefit as the proportion devoted to attorneys’ fees of any
given settlement grows. Defendants are indifferent to the division of
settlement proceeds between class members and class counsel.
Their interest is simply in minimizing the expected cost of the
total settlement.99
Defendants, in fact, prefer a settlement that maximizes class
counsel’s share of the settlement fund. Suppose class counsel would
be willing to settle a class action if they receive $5 million in fees, and
they are indifferent to whether the class receives $10 million or $20
million. The defendant much prefers a total settlement of $15
million, representing a share for class counsel of 33%, to a total
settlement of $25 million, representing a share for class counsel of
20%. The interests of defendants and class counsel to this extent
align, and they are adverse to the interest of class members.100
Because of the potential that a settlement will short-change the
class, the district court has an obligation to protect the interests of
class members. Some circuit courts have observed that “the district
court acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of
absent class members.”101 The district court must determine that the
settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,”102 and in making that
determination it must find that any attorneys’ fees provided for in
the settlement are reasonable.103 The court must take into account
98. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting a district court’s “duty to protect the members of a class in class action litigation
from lawyers for the class who may, in derogation of their professional and fiduciary
obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the class”); David L.
Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 958-60
(1998); Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 9, at 384-93.
99. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]his court has recognized that ‘a defendant is interested
only in disposing of the total claim asserted against it; . . . the allocation between the class
payment and the attorneys’ fees is of little or no interest to the defense.’ ”(quoting Prandini
v. Nat’l Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1977))).
100. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 1390-91.
101. Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975); see also
Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We and other
courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class
action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the
law requires of fiduciaries.”); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001);
In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 785; Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir.
1987); Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 433 (2d Cir. 1983); Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d
1306, 1327-30 (5th Cir. 1980).
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
103. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee notes to
2003 Amendments, ¶ 3 (“Whether or not there are formal objections, the court must
determine whether a fee award is justified and, if so, set a reasonable fee.”); In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We have repeatedly held that a
district court abuses its discretion if it approves a class action settlement without
determining that any attorneys’ fees claimed as part of the settlement are reasonable and
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any issues bearing upon the fairness of the settlement.104 In theory,
then, class members are protected by the district court, regardless of
whether anyone objects to the settlement. In practice, though, the
district court may not have the information necessary to recognize an
infirmity in the settlement, and that information may be provided
by objectors.105
The structure of class action litigation, therefore, imposes
fiduciary obligations on class counsel to protect the interests of the
entire class. Because their economic self-interest diverges from the
interests of class members, however, the district court is given a
supervisory responsibility to ensure that class counsel discharge
their obligations and, ultimately, that any settlement serves the
interests of the class. But the court may need independently provided
information to discharge its responsibility, and that information may
come from objectors. Further, even an informed, well-meaning judge
will make mistakes, and the method of error correction used in the
United States legal system (and many others) is the appeals process.
The policy objective, therefore, is to obtain the benefits of legitimate
objections and appeals while avoiding the costs of extortionate ones.
The optimal approach is that which produces the greatest net value.
A number of methods are possible.
A. Prohibit Appeal
If the right to appeal class action settlements were limited to
named parties, professional objectors would virtually disappear.
Objectors might still challenge settlements in fairness hearings solely
to be paid off, but the licit extortion value of such a challenge would
be minimal. The rule, however, would have an adverse impact on
legitimate objectors: they would lose access to the appellate process
as an error correction device. Access to that process is particularly
valuable when class members have no other way to escape the effects
of an erroneous judgment. Devlin, for example, was a case brought
under Rule 23(b)(1), and under that provision, nonnamed class
members are bound by the settlement and have no ability to opt out
that the settlement itself is reasonable in light of those fees.”); Strong v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1998); Piambino, 610 F.2d at 1328.
104. See, e.g., Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 279-80 (noting that district courts must “exercise
the highest degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions” and
reversing approval because “the judge did not give the issue of the settlement’s adequacy
the care it deserved”).
105. Courts will typically consider the merits of objections even if they believe the
objections are lodged by professional objectors. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft
Litig., No. 09-MD-02036-JKL, 2011 WL 5873389, at *24 n.30 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2011)
(noting that the court had considered the objections of professional objectors on the merits
and rejected them).
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of it.106 One could argue that the right to appeal need not be
recognized in Rule 23(b)(3) cases because in these, nonnamed class
members have another method of avoiding the effects of an erroneous
judgment: they can opt out.107 They may opt out of the class when
they receive notice of the class action, and even if they first receive
notice of class certification before a tentative settlement is reached,
they will receive a second notice afterward and may be given another
chance to opt out of the action. Devlin, in fact, could be read to
support this view. The Court emphasized that what was “most
important” to its decision was that nonnamed class members would
be “bound by the settlement.”108 They had “no ability to opt out of the
settlement,” and so “appealing the approval of the settlement is
petitioner’s only means of protecting himself from being bound by a
disposition of his rights he finds unacceptable and that a reviewing
court might find legally inadequate.”109 This is the “feature of class
action litigation that requires that class members be allowed to
appeal the approval of a settlement.”110 One court has so read Devlin
and has held that under similar state class action rules the right of
nonnamed class members to appeal settlements is confined to those
in mandatory classes.111
Most courts that have addressed the question, however, have read
Devlin to extend to all class actions,112 and we believe that
recognizing a right to appeal in opt-out cases is the correct approach.
As a legal matter, the logic of Devlin leads to the recognition of a
broad right, even if some language in the opinion suggests a narrow
holding.113 The decision is based on the principle that an objecting
106. See supra text accompanying note 84.
107. See, e.g., Barnhorst, supra note 19, at 109 (“[F]ailure to opt out of a class, either
prior to settlement or at the settlement stage, should, in the interests of efficiency and
equity, foreclose the opportunity to appeal a district court’s settlement approval.”).
108. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002). For this reason, objectors who claim
they were wrongly excluded from a class are not parties to the action and may not appeal.
See AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 361 F.3d 1305, 1309-10 (11th
Cir. 2004).
109. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 10.
111. See Ballard v. Advance America, 79 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Ark. 2002); see also In re
Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 302 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 2002) (questioning
“whether Devlin’s holding applies to opt-out class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3)” and
opining that “the limited reading of Devlin has considerable merit”).
112. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Chain Drug Stores v. New England Carpenters Health
Benefits Fund, 582 F.3d 30, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he weight of authority holds that
Devlin applies to all class actions.”); Fidel v. Farley, 534 F.3d 508, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2008);
Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 572 (9th Cir. 2004).
113. Another way in which Devlin might be given narrow scope is to focus on the
Court’s language that “petitioner will only be allowed to appeal that aspect of the District
Court’s order that affects him—the District Court’s decision to disregard his objections.”
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9. One court relied on this passage to conclude that an objector was
permitted to appeal only to the extent the judgment approving the settlement “affects him
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member of a class must have a realistic opportunity to avoid the
binding effect of a settlement, at least until the settlement has been
reviewed by an appellate court. Opting out of a class action is usually
not a viable alternative to class resolution of a claim, because the
claimant will not typically have a practical opportunity to pursue the
claim outside of the certified class.114 The realistic choices the
disgruntled class member faces ordinarily are either to accept a
settlement that has not been ratified by the appellate court or to
forgo her claim. If absent members of a non-opt-out class have a right
to appeal, so must those of an opt-out class.
The economic logic of class action appeals leads to the same
conclusion. A rule that prohibited appeals by nonnamed members of
opt-out classes would virtually eliminate professional objectors, but it
would also insulate settlements agreeable to counsel for all named
parties and the district court from appellate review. Importantly, this
does not mean that a settlement is insulated from objection,
legitimate or otherwise. Legitimate objections brought before the
district court may be critical in providing the court information
needed to assess the adequacy of the settlement. A bar to appeal
would not impede them in any way, though for that matter a right of
appeal does not increase the information brought forward by objectors.
Appellate courts review the legal significance of information.
Rather, the relevant social loss is the cost of error in district court
approvals that would be reversed on appeal. That error cost is a
function of the stakes in the litigation, and they will vary greatly.
But it is also a function of the district court’s error rate and the
appellate court’s reversal rate, and something can be said about
them. The appellate process is premised on the assumption that
appellate court decisions are more accurate than district court
decisions, in part because appellate decisions are the product of
multiple judges whereas lower court decisions represent a single
judge’s decision, and in part because appellate courts are perceived to
personally” and not “on behalf of the entire [c]lass.” Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,
No. 91-0986-CIV, 2006 WL 1132371, at *17 n.13, 18 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2006). The court
seemed to believe that such a rule would foreclose the possibility of a decision on appeal
that affected more than the individual interests of the objector. But objections if successful
on appeal would typically result in a benefit to at least a group of class members including
the objector, and so the appeal would necessarily be undertaken on behalf of multiple class
members, with a resolution affecting potentially the entire class. As another court
observed, “[W]e can see no practical way to separate Objectors’ individual interests from
those of the other class members.” Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180,
1183 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002).
114. One alternative to class litigation that might prove viable is an action in small
claims court, an alternative that has achieved some recent success. See Carolyn Whetzel &
Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Opt Out’s Use of Social Media Against Honda in Small Claim Win
Possible “Game Changer,” CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (Feb. 10, 2012).
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be of higher decisionmaking quality than trial courts. Indeed, an
economic justification of the appellate process is that maintaining
disparate quality between court levels is a more efficient method of
achieving a desired level of accuracy than investing in higher quality
at the lower court level.115 District courts, therefore, are expected to
make mistakes, and that is true for class action settlement approvals
as well as for every other kind of decision they make. Further,
appellate courts are expected to make fewer mistakes, correcting
some of the mistakes made below and not reversing too many
decisions that were correct. What some believe, however, is that the
error rate for district court approval of settlement agreements is
higher than the average for all of their decisions, because district
judges are biased in favor of ending litigation; we return to this issue
later.116 For now, we assume that district courts err in approving
settlements more frequently than they err in other decisions, using
as a definition of error a deviation from the objectively correct result,
or the result that would be reached with perfect information.
The error correction rate, or reversal rate, is a function of the
appellate court’s scope of review. As appellate review becomes more
deferential, the reversal rate declines, and review of class action
settlements are highly deferential. As a technical matter, settlement
approvals are subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard, and that
standard accords substantial deference to the district court.117 An
appellate court may well conclude that it would not have approved
the settlement but that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in approving it. Further, many of the issues that might be raised in
an appeal of a settlement, such as the effort of class counsel as it
affects the magnitude of attorneys’ fees, are the kind of issues that
district courts have a comparative advantage in resolving, which is,
of course, why the law imposes a deferential standard of review.
Appellate courts are understandably reluctant to overturn decisions
that the district court was in a better position to make. Finally,
courts recognize a strong public interest in settling class action
litigation,118 a recognition that cuts in favor of deferential review. For

115. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process As a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379, 387 (1995).
116. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., In re Pet Food Prods. Liability Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted)) (“We review the decision of the District Court to . . . approve [a] settlement under
an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion may be found where the district
court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or
an improper application of law to fact.”).
118. See, e.g., id. at 351 (“We reaffirm the ‘overriding public interest in settling class
action litigation.’ ” (quoting In re Warfarin Sodium, 391 F.3d at 535)).

894

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:865

all of these reasons, a modest number of errors made by district
courts in approving settlements are likely to be corrected on appeal.
The implication of this analysis is that prohibiting appeals by
nonrepresentatives of settlements in opt-out cases would probably
not impose especially high social costs resulting from erroneous
approvals. Nevertheless, we prefer an appeal bond procedure because
it is likely to result in marginally lower social costs yet suppress
extortionate conduct nearly as effectively while imposing modest
additional administrative costs.
B. Require Intervention
The United States in Devlin argued that nonnamed class members
should be required to intervene in the district court to have the right
to appeal a judgment approving a settlement.119 Justice Scalia, for
himself and two other members of the Court, agreed.120 Justice Scalia
was primarily concerned with maintaining what he believed to be a
clear and settled rule that a nonnamed member of a class in a class
action is not a “ ‘party’ to the judgment approving the class
settlement.”121 But he agreed with the government that requiring
objectors to intervene before appealing would also “enable district
courts ‘to perform an important screening function.’ ”122 The
government and dissenting justices recognized that class members
objecting to a settlement would almost always be entitled to
intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, even
after the class judgment has been entered.123 Given that right, the
Court reasoned, little would be gained by requiring intervention.124
The government and the dissenting justices argued that district
judges could deny intervention and thus preclude appeal of the
settlement judgment in a few situations, three of which are
potentially relevant to the conduct of professional objectors: (1)
“where the objector is not actually a member of the settlement class
or is otherwise not entitled to relief from the settlement”; (2) where

119. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 11.
120. See id. at 23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 15. Justice Scalia observed that “avoiding the reduction to indeterminacy of
the hitherto clear rule regarding who is a party is ‘value’ enough” to require intervention to
appeal. Id. at 21.
122. Id. (quoting Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 21, Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002) (No. 01-417)).
123. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 12 (majority opinion), 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. See id. at 12-13 (majority opinion).
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an objector seeks to appeal even though her objection was successful;
and (3) where the objection at the fairness hearing was untimely.125
As we have explained, what is critical in pursuing an extortionate
strategy is that the professional objector delay implementation of the
settlement for the pendency of an appeal. A professional objector can
pursue such a strategy even if she does not represent a class member
entitled to relief, represents a class member whose objection has been
sustained and addressed in the settlement, or filed an untimely
objection, so long as she can file an appeal however groundless and
interrupt the execution of the settlement.
The Court believed that the situations in which an intervention
requirement would screen out appeals would arise infrequently.126
The Court thought that individuals who are not entitled to relief but
object anyway are irrational and remain irrational if they appeal;
individuals who successfully object are rational and are unlikely to
appeal irrationally.127 The infrequent instances of irrational appeals,
the Court concluded, can be addressed at the appellate level.128
Justice Scalia disputed the Court’s “sunny surmise that the
appeals will be few.”129 He recognized that an objection and appeal
might be irrational in substance even though the conduct of making
the objection and filing the appeal is rational, citing a case involving
professional objectors.130 Justice Scalia seemed to understand,
therefore, that the strategy of extortion is viable and that one cannot
assume that it will be pursued infrequently. But requiring
intervention will not effectively squelch it. Professional objectors can
locate actual class members, file meritless and unsuccessful
objections on their behalf, request intervention as of right, and
appeal the judgment approving the settlement. That path of extortion
is not unlikely; indeed, it seems to be the common path traveled by
professional objectors.131 Justice Scalia, having astutely recognized
the potential for extortion, advocates a rule that would do little to
prevent it, though perhaps more than does the approach adopted by
the Court. In the end, requiring intervention as a prerequisite to

125. Id. at 13. The government and the dissenting justices also noted that the
screening function would be valuable where there is a need to consolidate duplicative
appeals. See id.; id. at 21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 13-14 (majority opinion).
127. See id. at 13.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 22 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. See id.
131. Moreover, if an objector were denied intervention, she might appeal that decision.
The intervention requirement would be useless in deterring extortion unless
implementation of the settlement goes forward while the appeal is pending or the appeal
can be resolved quickly.
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appeal would not stifle legitimate objectors, but it would not
effectively stifle professional objectors either.
C. Impose Sanctions
One approach to professional objectors is to impose sanctions on
them for extortionate behavior.132 Because the kind of extortion that
is most dangerous involves a meritless objection followed by a
groundless appeal, the district court or the appellate court could
potentially impose sanctions or instigate the imposition of sanctions
by other legal authorities. Sanctions would have to be calibrated to
deter objectionable conduct without deterring desirable conduct.133
And discovery, either initiated by a court or opposing attorneys,
might be necessary to determine whether improper conduct
occurred.134 Though courts have imposed sanctions on professional
objectors, they have not done so often, despite frequently identifying
professional objectors as the source of objections. There are good
reasons for the infrequency of sanction orders, and the sanction
approach is not likely to be effective.
To begin with, a district court could impose or instigate the
imposition of sanctions for conduct leading up to the filing of an
objection. For example, the district court might find, likely after
132. See, e.g., Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.),
No. CIV.A. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1665134, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2000) (suggesting that the
imposition of sanctions by the appellate court for the filing of a frivolous appeal is an
adequate remedy for an appeal filed solely as an attempt to leverage a settlement).
133. Sanctions are typically thought of as monetary penalties or professional
disciplinary actions, but they can more broadly be understood in this context as any
penalty imposed by a court. In this sense, a sanction might be to deem a frivolous objection
waived or withdrawn. Unless such a sanction were considered unappealable, it would not
do much to curtail extortionate objections. In one case, the parties requested the court to
impose objection procedures that entailed the following: setting a deadline for written
notice of objection and requiring that the notice include proof of class membership, specific
objections, and grounds for objection; precluding those who do not provide such a notice
from appearing at the settlement hearing and deeming their objections waived; and
permitting class or defense counsel to conduct discovery related to the objection. See
Trombley v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 08-cv-456-JD, 2011 WL 3740488, at *5 (D.R.I. Aug. 24,
2011). The court set a deadline and required written submissions, but it did not order that
noncompliant objections be deemed waived or permit discovery. See id. at *5-6. The court
suggested that the sanction for noncompliance would be that the court would not consider
the objection. See id. at *6.
134. See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. CV-07-5944-SC, 2012
WL 1319881, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012) (granting class counsel’s motion to compel
discovery from class member objector to explore inter alia his relationship with a reputed
professional objector); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294-95
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that court ordered objectors’ attorneys to answer questions seeking
to determine whether they have a “practice of objecting to class action settlements for the
purpose of securing a settlement from class counsel”). Cf. Trombley, 2011 WL 3740488, at
*5-6 (noting that class and defense counsel requested that they be “entitled to depose the
objector and to seek discovery related to the objection” but denying the request).
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discovery, that an attorney violated ethical obligations by soliciting
class members to object to a settlement135 or entering into fee
arrangements with them,136 and it might impose sanctions or refer
the attorney to disciplinary authorities.137 The court might identify
ethical violations in the overtures a professional objector makes to
class counsel, such as a suggestion that the objector will withdraw an
appeal in exchange for a donation to a charity in which the objector is
financially interested.138 But professional objectors need not engage
in unethical conduct of this sort. Alternatively, the court might
impose sanctions for the act of filing or the content of an objection.
For example, the judge might find that the professional objector
purported to represent a class member who was not in fact a member
of the class, a possibility recognized in Devlin.139 In such a case, the
court might impose sanctions for violation of Rule 11, for the court
might deem the objection to have been filed for an “improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase
the cost of litigation”140 or to contain an implicit or explicit “factual
contention[]”—that the identified objector is a member of the class—
lacking “evidentiary support.”141 Once again, however, professional
objectors need not represent phantom class members.
Similarly, the court might find that a meritless objection filed on
behalf of an actual class member violates Rule 11. A court may
impose sanctions for a frivolous filing or for a nonfrivolous filing
135. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2006).
136. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2007).
137. District courts have two primary statutory bases for the imposition of sanctions,
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The latter provides
that an attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
The purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is unquestionably to deter misconduct, whereas the
purpose of § 1927 sanctions may be both deterrence and compensation. See Lamboy-Ortiz
v. Ortiz-Vélez, 630 F.3d 228, 247 (1st Cir. 2010). District courts also have inherent
equitable powers to impose sanctions for vexatious conduct. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 45 (1973) (“[I]t is unquestioned that a federal court may award counsel fees to a successful
party when his opponent has acted ‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons.’ ” (quoting 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 54.77(2), at 1709 (2d ed. 1972))). For
expositional simplicity, we focus on Rule 11, but the specific source of sanctions imposed on
professional objectors is not especially important.
138. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 294 (noting that in an
unrelated case, a pro se objector “created a nonprofit organization and entered into a
stipulation pursuant to which he withdrew his objection to a $3.2 billion class settlement in
exchange for a $300,000 donation to his organization, plus an additional $40,000 payment
to himself and his then-counsel”).
139. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 13 (2002) (recognizing possibility that
appeal is brought on behalf of someone who is not a member of the settlement class but
finding it insufficient to require nonnamed class members to intervene as a precondition
to appeal).
140. F. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
141. F. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
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made for an improper purpose, such as extortion.142 Courts have been
reluctant to conclude that objections are so devoid of merit as to be
frivolous, given that boilerplate arguments asserting deficiencies in a
class action settlement based on elastic legal standards cannot
typically be dismissed out of hand.143 Courts are often willing to
assert that objectors are professionals, but ascribing extortionate
motives to them when motive is insusceptible of conclusive proof is
another matter.144 Judges tend to be circumspect, and they shy away
from impugning motives and imposing consequences without
substantial evidence. If they impose sanctions without firm support,
they risk reversal,145 albeit under a deferential standard of review.146
To the extent the infrequency of sanctions imposed by district
courts is a product of unduly strict requirements embodied in Rule
11, those requirements could be loosened, and sanctions might
become an effective deterrent. But there is a structural reason why
district courts are not likely to suppress extortion through sanctions,
however direct that method might seem. The district court’s
obligations to the class push the court to consider all objections to a
settlement, whether substantial or baseless. The issue of whether
objectors engaged in sanctionable conduct is a collateral matter that
will complicate and likely prolong the litigation. From the standpoint
of the judge, class counsel and defendants receive what they want, an
approved settlement. They apparently have little to gain from an
order imposing sanctions, and yet that order will take the court’s
142. See Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 659-61 (7th Cir. 2003).
143. See, e.g., Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 CV 10035(HB), 2011 WL
5873383, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011) (refusing to find conduct of attorneys to have been
undertaken in bad faith or vexatious and observing that “[m]erely characterizing some of
the attorneys as ‘professional objectors’ without specifying what, exactly, they have done
that is either in bad faith or vexatious, is not enough”); Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc.,
No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, at *8 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008) (“While the
Court reaches no conclusion as to frivolousness and bad faith . . . , the Court would be hard
pressed to say that all of the objections were patently frivolous.”).
144. Sometimes courts are even reluctant to use the term “professional objector.” In In
re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL
786513, at *1-2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2010), the court refused to adopt class counsel’s “pejorative
characterization” of objectors’ attorneys as “ ‘professional objectors’ who have a long record
of extorting payment from class counsel by filing frivolous appeals.” But it nevertheless
found that objectors’ attorneys “have a documented history of filing notices of appeal from
orders approving other class action settlements, and thereafter dismissing said appeals
when they and their clients were compensated by the settling class or counsel for the
settling class” and that the appeals taken in the instant case “are frivolous and are
tantamount to a stay of the [j]udgment” approving the settlement. Id.
145. See Vollmer, 350 F.3d at 663 (vacating the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on
purported professional objectors where record did not demonstrate that objections were
frivolous or filed for extortionate purpose).
146. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (“[A]n appellate
court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district
court’s Rule 11 determination.”).

2012]

CLASS ACTION PROFESSIONAL OBJECTORS

899

time and effort. Of course, extortionate behavior can interrupt
implementation of the settlement, injuring the class, class counsel,
and the defendants. Further, extortionate behavior in a case imposes
a negative externality, making extortion more likely in other cases
and undermining the integrity of the legal system. A court could find
that the internal and external benefits of pursuing the collateral
matter of the professional objector’s behavior are worth the costs. But
our experience suggests that courts generally take a narrow view of
the interests at stake, and they are not likely to embrace an
aggressive role in policing the conduct of professional objectors. If
district courts do not now consistently use sanctions to deter
objectionable behavior, it is difficult to imagine what mechanism
could be used to induce them to act differently.
Appellate courts can impose sanctions for frivolous appeals,147 and
an “appeal is frivolous if, applying an objective standard, it is wholly
without merit.”148 The hallmark of a professional objector’s appeal is
its lack of substantive merit. Nevertheless, courts are circumspect in
declaring appeals frivolous.149 One court explained that
circumspection is appropriate “so that novel theories will not be
chilled and litigants advancing any claim or defense which has
colorable support under existing law or reasonable extensions thereof
will not be deterred.”150 Given the nature of the legal standards at
issue in class action settlements, circumspect appellate courts will
hesitate to conclude that, objectively speaking, a professional
objector’s arguments lack colorable support, regardless of the
objector’s extortionate motive. Moreover, professional objectors can
withdraw their appeals before resolution. Though appellate courts
147. See FED. R. APP. P. 38.
148. Premier Pork, L.L.C. v. Westin Packaged Meats, Inc., 406 F. App’x 613, 618 (3d
Cir. 2011). See also Golden v. Helen Sigman & Assocs., 611 F.3d 356, 366-67 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“We have held that an appeal qualifies as frivolous if either ‘the result is obvious’ or ‘the
appellant’s argument is wholly without merit.’ ” (quoting Wiese v. Cmty. Bank of Cent.
Wis., 552 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2009))); NLRB v. Unbelievable, Inc., 71 F.3d 1434, 1441
(9th Cir. 1995) (same); Bonfiglio v. Nugent, 986 F.2d 1391, 1393 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating
that an appeal is frivolous if it is “utterly devoid of merit”); Braley v. Campbell, 832
F.2d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1987) (“An appeal is frivolous when the result is obvious, or
the appellant’s arguments of error are wholly without merit.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
149. See, e.g., Premier Pork, 406 F. App’x at 618 (“[W]e . . . exercise caution in
classifying appeals as frivolous . . . .”); Sheldon v. Khanal, 396 F. App’x 737, 740 (2d Cir.
2010) (holding that conduct in an appeal had not “yet reached the sanctionable level” even
though conduct during the course of the “litigation has been, on the whole, highly
troubling” and the institution of a new suit during the pendency of the appeal was
“particularly questionable”); Golden, 611 F.3d at 367 (declining to impose sanctions even
though appellant “raised a good number of frivolous points on appeal” where he also raised
“a number of issues that could not be dismissed out of hand” and describing its decision as
“a closer call than it should be”).
150. Hilmon Co. (V.I.) v. Hyatt Int’l, 899 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1990).
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presumably would retain jurisdiction to impose sanctions under
Appellate Rule 38,151 it is nearly inconceivable that they would
pursue sanctions sua sponte. They are busy, and most likely no judge
would even have been assigned the appeal at the time it was
withdrawn.152 Class counsel who paid professional objectors to
withdraw would not seek sanctions, and those who successfully
resisted attempted extortion would be sorely tempted to drop the
matter as well.
Assuming that district or appellate courts would impose sanctions,
they would have to determine the magnitude. That is not an easy
task. An optimal sanction will deter extortionate behavior without
deterring desirable behavior. Rule 11 limits a sanction “to what
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated.”153 That constraint would appear loose
enough to allow a district court to impose an adequate sanction to
deter extortionate behavior, but it does not provide a guide for
determining the sanction within the upper bound. A district court
would have to set a sanction bearing some relationship to the
objectionable conduct that occurred in proceedings before the district
court, though it can be set high enough to deter repetition or similar
conduct by others. But a critical aspect of professional objector
activity is the appeal, and a sanction focused on conduct prior to the
appeal would almost certainly be inadequate. Expanding the focus of
conduct would require a rule change.
Federal Appellate Rule 38 permits a court of appeal to “award just
damages and single or double costs to the appellee” as a sanction for
a frivolous appeal.154 At a minimum, an appropriate sanction would
have to take into account the probability that any sanction would be
imposed. Professional objectors may withdraw their appeals, and as
explained above, appellate courts are not likely to impose sanctions
in those cases. An appropriate adjustment is to multiply the damages
caused by the objector by the reciprocal of the probability that a
sanction will be imposed, sometimes called the enforcement error.155
That may result in a very high number, and appellate courts might
be unwilling to impose such a sanction. That hesitancy, indeed, may
151. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 398 (holding that voluntary dismissal of a
complaint does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to impose sanctions under
Rule 11).
152. This fact distinguishes a district court after a complaint is withdrawn from an
appellate court after an appeal is withdrawn. A district judge is invested in a case to an
extent that an appellate judge is not.
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4).
154. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
155. See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 62, at 260; POSNER, supra note 44,
at 277.
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be economically justified, for the possibility that the court will
mistake a legitimate but groundless appeal for the frivolous appeal of
a professional objector implies that the sanction will deter desirable
behavior. The appropriate sanction could be reduced by increasing
the probability of imposition, and that might be accomplished by
allowing the district court to impose a sanction calculated to include
the damages caused by an appeal. The sanctionable conduct would
then include the act of filing an appeal, which requires the filing of a
notice of appeal in the district court, and district courts could
theoretically impose sanctions in all cases, lowering the damage
multiple to one. But district courts are not now permitted to impose
sanctions under Rule 11 for conduct relating directly to an appeal,156
and anyway, they are not likely to impose sanctions in all cases for
the reasons discussed above. More importantly, as repeat players,
professional objectors may invest in creating a reputation. A sanction
calculated on the basis of damages caused in an individual case
adjusted to account for enforcement error might not deter the
conduct. The sanction affects the size of the investment, but the
investment may nevertheless be rational.
In any event, an appropriate sanction would relate to the damages
done by the objectionable behavior. That benchmark is also the
correct one in setting an appeal bond, a topic we explore below. At
heart, the difference between an optimal sanction for a frivolous
appeal in this context and the requirement of an optimal appeal bond
is the difference between an ex post incentive and an ex ante one.
Both will be based on the costs imposed on others by the appeal.
The ex ante incentive is preferable, however, because it is cheaper
to administer.
In theory, therefore, sanctions could be set that adequately deter
extortionate behavior and do not deter legitimate objections. But a
sanction approach would involve high administrative costs, if it could
be implemented at all.
D. Expedite Appeals
Nearly every federal appellate court has procedures to expedite
appeals, by permitting motions for summary disposition and
expedited review.157 Because the cost of extortionate behavior is a
156. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405-09 (holding that a district court may not,
pursuant to Rule 11, order an appellant to reimburse the appellee for attorneys’ fees
incurred on appeal).
157. See 1ST CIR. R. 27.0(c) (summary disposition); 2D CIR. R. 27.1(d) (emergency
motions); 3D CIR. R. 4.1 (motions to expedite); 3D CIR. R. 27.4 (motion for summary action);
4TH CIR. R. 27(f) (motions for summary disposition); 5TH CIR. R. 27.5 (motions to expedite
appeal); 6TH CIR. R. 27(e) (motion to expedite appeal); 7TH CIR. I.O.P. 1(c)(7) (recognizing
motion to expedite briefing); 9TH CIR. R. 3-6 (summary disposition of civil appeals); 9TH
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function of delay in implementing the settlement, speeding up the
resolution of a professional objector’s appeal is a possible solution.158
But in most cases, quick appellate resolution is impractical, and in
many it is unwise.
Summary disposition is appropriate when the papers filed in the
appellate court clearly show that no substantial legal question is
presented.159 Normally the standard can be satisfied only when the
appeal can be resolved by the straightforward application of a
specific, unambiguous legal standard. Some appeals by professional
objectors might satisfy the standard for summary disposition. For
example, if the briefs demonstrate that the professional objector is
appealing on behalf of a person who is not a member of the class,
summary disposition is appropriate, for the court may easily
determine that the objector’s client is not a party to the action. But
most appeals, even if frivolous, will not be so easily resolved. The
underlying legal standard is spongy, such as that attorneys’ fees
must be reasonable, and the application of the standard requires
judgment. True, the appellate court’s obligation is merely to
determine whether the district judge abused her discretion in
determining that the fee award is reasonable, and that determination
may be easier to make than the initial determination of
reasonableness. But even taking into account the scope of review, few
appeals will present no substantial legal question.
Expedited proceedings are designed for matters of such
importance that they deserve to be resolved before other pending
appeals. There must be an “exceptional reason that warrants
expedition.”160 However significant the problem of professional
objector extortion may be, one can hardly say that the stakes
involved trump those presented by the range of other cases resolved
CIR. R. 27-3(b) (urgent motions); 10TH CIR. R. 27.2 (summary disposition); 11TH CIR. R. 271(d)(9) (motion to expedite appeals); D.C. CIR. R. 27(f) (requests for expeditious
consideration); D.C. CIR. R. 27(g) (dispositive motions).
158. See, e.g., Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 961 (9th Cir. 2007)
(suggesting that appellate courts can deter frivolous appeals by disposing of them at the
outset through a screening process or by granting an appellee’s motion to dismiss); In re
Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The traditional
countermeasure for an appeal thought to be frivolous is a motion in the appellate court to
dismiss . . . .”); Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033,
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008) (noting that settling parties can respond to a frivolous
appeal by moving “to dismiss or expedite the appeal”); Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In
re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. CIV.A. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1665134, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 6, 2000) (observing that “an immediate motion to dismiss filed in the court of appeals”
is one method that can adequately protect an appellee against frivolous appeals).
159. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 27.0(c) (“At any time . . . the court may dismiss the appeal . . .
if it shall clearly appear that no substantial question is presented.”); 3D CIR. R. 27.4(a) (“A
party may move for summary action affirming . . . a judgment . . . alleging that no
substantial question is presented . . . .”).
160. 3D CIR. R. 4.1.
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by federal appellate courts. To resolve professional
out of turn would reduce social welfare by delaying
more pressing cases, even recognizing that the
dispose of the appeal would be relatively short.
priority to frivolous appeals would be ironic.
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objector appeals
the resolution of
time needed to
Indeed, to give

E. Use Quick-Pay Provisions
A recent initiative in the campaign against professional objectors
is the use of quick-pay provisions in class action settlement
agreements.161 These provisions stipulate that class counsel will
receive attorneys’ fees when the settlement is approved by the
district court, subject to refund if the settlement is later set aside.162
In conventional class action settlements by contrast, defendants are
not obligated to pay attorneys’ fees until approval of the settlement is
final, which means the time at which all appeals have been resolved
or the opportunity to appeal has passed. The logic of quick-pay
provisions is that class counsel do not incur a cost of delay during the
pendency of appeal. As a result, the scope of extortion is minimal—
class counsel stand to lose only their direct litigation costs if
professional objectors appeal. These provisions are reportedly being
used with increasing frequency, predominantly in securities cases.163
Quick-pay provisions are only a partial solution to the professional
objector problem. First, many defendants will likely reject them out
of hand. To convince corporate executives to pay substantial amounts
to class counsel, albeit subject to refund, without buying peace
promises to be a hard sell.
Second, the provisions reduce the cost of extortion but do not
eliminate it. Consider the nature of the bargain between class
counsel and defendants. A quick-pay provision requires the
defendant to pay attorneys’ fees, which may represent a significant
part of the total settlement, earlier than she would have to do under
conventional settlements. Assume that class counsel are interested
solely in their attorneys’ fees, and suppose first that the parties use a
conventional settlement. Imagine that it provides for attorneys’ fees
of $10,000 and the district court’s judgment is entered at year zero. If
no appeal is taken, class counsel will earn interest at a rate of 10%,
or $1000, by year one, for a total payoff of $11,000 at year one. If an
appeal is taken and ultimately rejected at year one, class counsel will
receive $10,000 at that time, thus losing the $1000 in interest they
would have earned absent an appeal. In the simple case, where the
161. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 19, at 1640-41.
162. See id. at 1641.
163. See id. at 1642-46.
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appeal is certain to lose and appellate litigation costs are assumed to
be zero, it is this $1000 that creates an opportunity for the
professional objector to extort by threatening to appeal. The
bargaining space is $1000. Imagine that the parties split the
cooperative surplus and class counsel pay the objector $500 at year
zero not to appeal. The defendant therefore pays attorneys’ fees of
$10,000 at year zero, and class counsel receive a net of $9500 at that
time and begin implicitly earning interest on that amount; by year
one, class counsel would have $10,450—less than $11,000 but more
than $10,000. If the professional objector appeals, however, the
defendant would effectively earn the interest of $1,000 on the
attorneys’ fees between year zero and year one, because the
defendant would not be obligated to pay $10,000 until year one. From
the standpoint of the defendant, the appeal is a fortunate
contingency, and the defendant stands to gain $1000 from it. As the
probability of that contingency increases, its expected monetary
value approaches $1000.
Under a quick-pay provision, however, the defendant gives up the
expected gain.164 A rational, risk-neutral defendant would reduce the
amount she is willing to pay by the expected gain from delay in her
payment obligation. A quick-pay provision might be thought to create
competition between the professional objector and the defendant to
extract the cooperative surplus available when the objector threatens
to appeal. If class counsel and the defendants use a quick-pay
provision, the professional objector receives no share of the surplus; if
class counsel and the professional objector strike a deal under a
conventional settlement agreement, the defendants receive no share
of the bargaining surplus. Competition between the professional
objector and the defendants in theory could drive the amount
demanded by class counsel’s bargaining partner to zero.
Competition, especially between two parties, is often imperfect,
however, and more important, the sequence of events impedes
competition. A professional objector is not likely to surface until after
a settlement is tentatively approved by the district court. That
settlement agreement will contain the quick-pay provision. When
class counsel and defendants are negotiating a class settlement, the
defendants are not competing with professional objectors. Rather,
class counsel and the defendants at best anticipate the risk of a
164. In the simple case used for illustrative purposes, the expected gain is bounded by
the date of the appellate court’s decision (or a short time thereafter as stipulated in a
conventional settlement agreement), because the appeal is assumed to be groundless. If
there is some probability that the appeal would succeed, however, the delay and hence the
expected gain from delay may increase as a function of the time required to conduct any
subsequent proceedings mandated by the appellate court.

2012]

CLASS ACTION PROFESSIONAL OBJECTORS

905

professional objector filing an objection and taking an appeal.
Suppose class counsel assess the risk at 50% and expect to strike the
deal described above under which class counsel pay the objector $500
not to appeal, receiving a net of $9500. The expected value to class
counsel of eliminating the possibility of the objection is $250. The
defendants earn no interest if an objector arises and is paid off, and
they earn no interest if no objector arises and they are obligated to
pay attorneys’ fees at year zero. The bargaining space is therefore
$250, and if class counsel and the defendants split this surplus, the
defendants would be willing to pay and class counsel would be willing
to accept $9875 in attorneys’ fees with a quick-pay provision.
Moreover, the simple case analyzed above assumes a zero
probability that the appeal will succeed. But suppose the probability
is positive, though small. Under a quick-pay provision, the defendant
incurs a risk that if the judgment is eventually overturned, she will
not recover the amounts paid in attorneys’ fees despite class counsel’s
refund obligations, for class counsel may have become insolvent.
Further, the defendant incurs a risk of litigation to recover the funds
even when class counsel remain solvent. A rational defendant would
demand a discount to incur these risks, even if they are small, and
the discount will exceed the expected monetary value of the loss if
she is risk averse.
The analysis above assumes a simple model. In a more
complicated model, appellate litigation costs are positive and the
defendants derive an expected benefit from resolving the class action
at the time of the final judgment, even though they would gain
interest on attorneys’ fees during delay incident to appeal. Stated
otherwise, a more complicated model can demonstrate that
defendants prefer an immediate settlement to a later one, even
though they lose the expected benefit of retaining the settlement
funds for some period of time.
A more fundamental objection to quick-pay provisions is that they
assume wholly self-interested class counsel. Suppose a settlement
provides for an immediate payment of attorneys’ fees at year zero,
but a professional objector threatens to delay the class distribution of
$50,000 until year one by filing a baseless appeal. The logic of quickpay provisions is that class counsel are immune to extortion because
they will suffer no loss from delay, and so extortion will fail. But if
class counsel take their fiduciary obligations to the class seriously,
they will identify with the loss the class would suffer and act in the
best interests of the class. A loss of $5000 in interest imposed on the
class is a loss imposed on class counsel, and class counsel may feel
compelled to sacrifice some of their fees to avoid the injury to the
class. Indeed, quick-pay provisions can be criticized to the extent they
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exacerbate agency problems by separating the interests of class
counsel from the interests of the class. Though as a practical matter
class counsel and the class do have divergent interests and class
counsel may well be motivated primarily by their narrow self
interest, class counsel are not likely to be indifferent to the interests
of the class, and for that reason quick-pay provisions do not eliminate
the possibility of extortion.
Experience teaches that quick-pay provisions are sometimes used,
indicating that they are valuable to both class counsel and
defendants in addressing professional objectors. But these provisions
do not eliminate extortion. Professional objectors continue to impose
a tax on class action settlements, even if the tax is paid to
defendants, and even if that tax is lower than it would be if a
conventional settlement were used and the tax were paid to the
objectors. In the end, quick-pay provisions do not pose a risk of
deterring legitimate appeals. But they also do not eliminate
extortion. They may be simply unacceptable to defendants’ managers,
and if they are used, they may merely reduce the level of extortionate
taxation and change the distribution of revenue.
F. Adopt Inalienability Rule
Professor Fitzpatrick proposes a creative approach to professional
objectors: adopt an inalienability rule prohibiting objectors from
settling their appeals.165 He reasons that “[i]f objectors were
prohibited from selling their right to appeal to class counsel, then
objectors who wished to appeal solely to extract rents from class
counsel eager to avoid delay, risk, and litigation costs would not
bother filing appeals at all.”166 Therefore, he contends, an
inalienability rule will entirely eliminate extortionate appeals, but it
will not deter any legitimate appeals, for legitimate objectors intend
to pursue their appeals to judicial resolution and will not view the
inability to sell their appeal as a burden.167 The rule “may be the
optimal solution to the problem of objector blackmail.”168
The flaw in this approach is that it does not prevent professional
objectors from extorting payments before the inalienability rule
attaches. Extortionate behavior in this context involves a sequence of
two acts: submitting an objection and filing an appeal. The
inalienability rule cannot sensibly vest until after the settlement is

165.
166.
167.
168.

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 19, at 1659-66.
Id. at 1662.
See id.
Id. at 1664.
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approved and notice of appeal is filed.169 But the professional objector
can offer not to file a notice of appeal in exchange for some payment.
Extortion is no less effective if perpetrated before an appeal is filed
than afterward. Indeed, the maximum amount that can be extorted
declines over time after an appeal is filed. Fitzpatrick apparently is
aware of the issue, observing in a footnote that “[i]t is important to
note that an inalienability rule should not simply push back the
period in which side settlements are negotiated to the thirty days
during which an objector must file a notice of appeal.”170 Actually, the
potential period of negotiation is not limited to that thirty-day period,
for a professional objector could propose a deal under which she
withholds an appeal even before she files an objection; the parties
simply anticipate that unless she is paid off the objector will file a
fruitless objection and appeal the settlement approval, and they
bargain accordingly. But having recognized the problem that an
inalienability rule might be circumvented by negotiating a deal
before the right vests, Fitzpatrick offers no solution. He simply points
out that an inalienability rule would not prevent legitimate objectors
from selling their right to appeal before they file a notice of appeal.171
An admission that a rule does not prevent casual extortion is not an
explanation as to how it prevents professional extortion.
An inalienability rule, moreover, could prevent socially valuable
agreements between class counsel and legitimate objectors settling
objections after notice of appeal is filed. Fitzpatrick would respond to
this risk by allowing appeal settlement agreements if they involve a
modification of the approved class settlement agreement and the
modified agreement is approved by the district court.172 The district
court, he argues, “could filter merely cosmetic modifications from
those in which other class members shared equally in the benefits
sought by the settling objector.”173 Further, an objector would be free
to withdraw an appeal and receive nothing in return, subject to some
verification, such as a sworn certification that the professional
objector received no consideration.174
169. If a firm rule of inalienability vested at the time an objection is filed, every
unsuccessful objector would be required to appeal. Such a rule would hardly increase social
welfare. The rule would have to provide for a method by which the obligation to appeal
could be compromised after it vested, much as Fitzpatrick now proposes for compromise
during the pendency of appeal, see id. at 1665, but that method involves high judicial
supervision costs. In any event, even a rule developed along these lines would fail to
address the fundamental problem, for professional objectors and class counsel could strike
a bargain before an objection is filed.
170. Id. at 1664 n.155.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1665.
173. Id.
174. See id.
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But this system begs to be circumvented. Given that the district
judge has already approved the class settlement agreement, she
would be hard pressed to reject any modification that increased the
net recovery of the class. Just what justification the court would have
to reject the modification on the ground that class members did not
“share equally” with the objector is hard to see. At a minimum, the
court would have a powerful incentive to approve the modification
even if the objector received a larger payoff than the marginal benefit
received by the class. The point of professional objector extortion is to
hold up class counsel, not the class, and so a deal with class counsel
would predictably take the form of a payment by class counsel from
their fees. Absent a modification requirement, an agreement to
withdraw an appeal might involve class counsel paying the objector
$1000 from their attorneys’ fees, thus earning $1000 less than
anticipated under the class settlement; with a modification
requirement, the agreement might involve changing the class
settlement agreement in a way that increases its value to the class by
$100, class counsel paying the objector $1000, and class counsel
ending up with $1100 less than provided for in the original class
settlement. Whose interests would the district court be protecting by
rejecting the modification on the ground that it is “cosmetic”? The
class is better off, the defendants are not harmed, and the objector
and class counsel support the change. Moreover, the possibility that
the professional objector and class counsel will reach a deal under
which the objector ostensibly receives nothing to give up her appeal,
which entirely negates the modification requirement, cannot be
casually dismissed by requiring a verification mechanism.
Professional objectors as a group are ethically challenged, and to
assume that they would not skirt or flout a certification requirement
or other verification device is heroic. Courts have not been aggressive
in policing the practices of professional objectors, and they are not
likely to be any more enthusiastic in enforcing ethical requirements
surrounding a verification device.
In the end, an inalienability rule will not prevent professional
objector extortion, though it will not deter legitimate appeals. It may
be structured not to discourage legitimate objectors from settling
their complaints during the pendency of appeal, but if it is, it
will inevitably create an opening for extortionate conduct by
professional objectors.
IV. APPEAL BONDS AS THE LEAST IMPERFECT APPROACH
Taking into account the desirable suppression of extortionate
appeals, the undesirable chilling of legitimate appeals, and the
administrative costs of any remedy, the approaches to the problem of
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professional objectors outlined above are all more or less imperfect.
The approach we favor is also imperfect, but it offers the greatest net
benefits, and we therefore believe that it is the optimal one. We
would presumptively require that any objecting nonnamed member
of a Rule 23(b)(3) class post as a condition of appeal a bond calibrated
to deter extortion. District courts have occasionally imposed an
appeal bond requirement on class action objectors.175 But courts have
disagreed on the legal constraints that affect the availability and
magnitude of appeal bonds, and most courts have concluded that the
amount of the bond is seriously constrained, undermining its
capacity to curb extortionate behavior.176
A. Existing Practice
Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a
“district court may require an appellant to file a bond or provide
other security in any form and amount necessary to ensure payment
of costs on appeal.”177 The rule is permissive, allowing but not
compelling a district court to require a bond. Accordingly, the court
must first decide whether to exercise its discretion. If the court
requires a bond, it then must decide the bond’s amount. Both
decisions depend on the purpose of a bond, which according to Rule 7
is “to ensure payment of costs on appeal.”178 A bond set at “costs on
appeal” would perfectly “ensure payment” of those costs, and a bond
set at any greater amount would not be “necessary” to the extent of
the excess, and hence, would be unauthorized.179 Conversely, a bond
of a lesser amount may be all that is necessary to “ensure payment of
costs on appeal,” and indeed any security may be unnecessary.180
Consequently, the decision whether to require a bond pursuant to
Rule 7 and the decision as to the amount of any bond required turn
on the meaning of “costs on appeal.”
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39, entitled “Costs,” contains
five subdivisions.181 Subdivision (a) specifies the parties against
whom costs should normally be assessed.182 Thus, for example, if an
appeal is dismissed or a judgment is affirmed, costs are usually taxed
175. See cases cited supra note 30.
176. See infra notes 195-214 and accompanying text.
177. FED. R. APP. P. 7.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. FED. R. APP. P. 39.
182. FED. R. APP. P. 39(a). Another subdivision provides that costs for or against the
United States may be assessed under Rule 39(a) only if authorized by law. FED. R. APP. P.
39(b). Another requires each court of appeals to fix the maximum rate for taxing the cost of
producing copies and limits the rate so fixed. FED. R. APP. P. 39(c). Still another specifies a
process to be used when a party wants costs taxed. FED. R. APP. P. 39(d).
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against the appellant;183 if a judgment is reversed, costs are taxed by
the court of appeals against the appellee.184 Subdivision (e) provides,
“The following costs on appeal are taxable in the district court for the
benefit of the party entitled to costs under this rule.”185 The
subdivision lists the following costs: “(1) the preparation and
transmission of the record; (2) the reporter’s transcript, if needed to
determine the appeal; (3) premiums paid for a supersedeas bond or
other bond to preserve rights pending appeal; and (4) the fee
for filing the notice of appeal.”186 Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides
that a “judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as
costs” certain items: “(1) [f]ees of the clerk and marshal; (2) [f]ees
for printed or electronically recorded transcripts . . . ; (3) [f]ees
and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) [f]ees for
exemplification and the costs of making copies . . . ; (5) [d]ocket fees
. . . ; [and] (6) [c]ompensation of court appointed experts” and costs
associated with interpreters.187 Because an appellate court is a “court
of the United States,” the above items constitute “costs” on appeal.
One interpretation of Rule 7 is that the “costs on appeal” referenced
there are the “costs on appeal” identified in Rule 39(e) and § 1920.188
But an interpretation of Rule 39(e) is that the rule merely lists the
“costs on appeal” that are taxable “under this rule,” meaning Rule 39,
and so it does not circumscribe the “costs on appeal” that an appeal
bond may secure under Rule 7.189 Thus all it does is specify, for
instance, the costs that may be taxed against the appellant under
Rule 39(a)(2) if a judgment is affirmed.
In most cases, plaintiffs and defendants are adversaries in both
the district and appellate court; either plaintiffs or defendants seek
in the appellate court to set aside the judgment below, and the other
side seeks to uphold it. But when an objector appeals the settlement
of a plaintiff’s class action, she seeks to set aside the judgment, and
183. See FED. R. APP. P. 39(a)(1); FED. R. APP. P. 39(a)(2).
184. FED. R. APP. P. 39(a)(3).
185. FED. R. APP. P. 39(e).
186. FED. R. APP. P. 39(e)(1)–(4).
187. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
188. See, e.g., In re Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per
curiam) (“The costs referred to [in Rule 7] . . . are simply those that may be taxed against
an unsuccessful litigant under Federal Appellate Rule 39 . . . .”). There is no question that
a court may include both “the costs listed in Appellate Rule 39(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920
when calculating the amount of an appeal bond.” In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., Sec. &
“ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Cv. 5575(SWK), 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007).
189. See, e.g., Sams v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.),
391 F.3d 812, 817 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[Rule 39] merely lists which costs of appeal can be
‘taxed’ by the district court if it chooses to order one party to pay costs to the other.”). The
Advisory Committee note does make clear, however, that the costs described in Rule 39(e)
are at least some of the costs of appeal that can be included in a Rule 7 bond. See FED. R.
APP. P. 39(e) advisory committee’s note (1967 Adoption).
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both class counsel and the defendants seek to uphold it. Courts have
had no trouble recognizing that the objector is a plaintiff and, at least
since Devlin, a party to the lawsuit. But the objector on appeal is in
an adversarial relationship with both the defendants and the
majority of plaintiffs. The fact that her interests are antagonistic to
those of other plaintiffs does not change her status as a plaintiff, and
courts that have required objectors to file appeal bonds under Rule 7
calculate the amount of the bond as if the objector is an ordinary
plaintiff.190 But, as we are about to explain, appellate courts have
split on whether such a bond may include costs in addition to those
specified in Rule 39.
Although the Supreme Court has not resolved the Rule 7 issue, it
decided in Marek v. Chesny that “costs” as used in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 means “all costs properly awardable under the
relevant substantive statute or other authority.”191 Rule 68 provides
that the offeree must “pay the costs incurred” after rejecting an offer
essentially if the judgment the offeree finally obtains is less than the
offer, but it does not define “costs.”192 The Court held that a plaintiff
in a civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not recover
attorneys’ fees she incurred after rejecting a settlement offer when
she ultimately recovers a judgment less than the offer.193 Section
1988 of the statute provides that a prevailing party in a § 1983 action
may be awarded attorneys’ fees “as part of the costs.”194 Because the
underlying statute defines attorneys’ fees as costs, the attorneys’ fees
incurred after an offer is rejected are part of the costs that cannot be
recovered by the offeree under Rule 68.
A majority of circuit courts that have addressed the Rule 7 issue
have relied on the logic of Marek to hold that the term “costs on
appeal” includes all expenses defined as costs by an applicable
substantive statute. For example, in Azizian v. Federated Department
Stores, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that “the term ‘costs on appeal’ in
Rule 7 includes all expenses defined as ‘costs’ by an applicable feeshifting statute.”195 The court reasoned that Rule 7 does not define
costs, just as Rule 68 does not define costs, and Marek’s inference
that the drafters of Rule 68 therefore intended to include all costs
190. However, when a court is permitted to include in an appeal bond costs that can be
assessed to a party under a substantive statute and the statute permits the court to tax a
litigant the costs incurred by her opponent in connection with a meritless “suit or . . .
defense,” the statute may not authorize the court to tax an objector because the objection is
not a suit or defense. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295-96
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). To this extent, the objector would not be treated as an ordinary plaintiff.
191. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
192. FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
193. Marek, 473 U.S. at 9-12.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
195. 499 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 2007).
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authorized by the underlying statute applies in parallel fashion to
Rule 7.196 The court also reasoned that, just as Marek relied in part
on the absence of congressional expressions to the contrary in
reaching its interpretation of Rule 68, Rule 39 “does not contain any
‘expression[] to the contrary.’ ”197 Invoking Marek’s admonition “that
we must take fee-shifting statutes at their word,”198 the court rejected
the argument that relying on underlying statutes to provide the
definition of Rule 7 bond costs places too much weight on possibly
inadvertent differences in wording.199 The Second Circuit in Adsani v.
Miller similarly held that Rule 7 costs include those defined by the
underlying statute, “read[ing] Marek to support the view that Rule
39 does not exhaustively define ‘costs.’ ”200 The Eleventh Circuit201
and the Sixth Circuit202 reached the same conclusion. The implication
of this position is that if the underlying statute symmetrically
requires the losing party to pay the attorneys’ fees of the winning
party, then an appeal bond may include appellate attorneys’ fees of
class counsel and defense counsel when a class settlement is
appealed;203 if the statute asymmetrically requires only that a losing
defendant pay the attorneys’ fees of a winning plaintiff, then an
appeal bond required of an objector may not include appellate
attorneys’ fees of the parties seeking to preserve the settlement.204
By contrast, the Third Circuit in Hirschensohn v. Lawyers Title
Insurance Corp. held that Rule 7 costs are only those that may be

196. See id. at 958.
197. Id. (quoting Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)).
198. Id. at 959 (citing Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)). The court also observed
that “allowing district courts to include appellate attorneys’ fees in estimating and ordering
security for statutorily authorized costs under Rule 7 comports with their role in taxing the
full range of costs of appeal.” Id.
199. Id. at 958-59.
200. 139 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998).
201. See Pedraza v. United Guar. Corp., 313 F.3d 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[B]oth
Marek and Adsani’s persuasive application of that decision lead us to conclude that the
meaning of ‘costs,’ as used in Rule 7, should be derived from the definition of costs
contained in the statutory fee shifting provision that attends the plaintiff’s underlying
cause of action.”).
202. See Sams v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 391
F.3d 812, 817 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We adopt the reasoning of the Second and Eleventh Circuits
and apply Marek to its interpretation of ‘costs’ under [Rule] 7.”).
203. One court held that if a statute permits a court symmetrically to order a party to
pay her opponent’s attorneys’ fees if the party’s suit or defense is without merit, it is not a
fee-shifting statute, but rather a statute that permits sanctions for frivolous filings and as
such does not authorize the inclusion of attorneys’ fees in the Rule 7 bond. See In re Initial
Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
204. See, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775
(JG)(VVP), 2010 WL 1049269, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010) (holding that appeal bond
could not include class counsels’ attorneys’ fees because Clayton Act allows successful
antitrust plaintiffs to recover fees, not the “prevailing party”).
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taxed against an unsuccessful litigant under Rule 39.205 Because
attorneys’ fees are not specified in Rule 39, they cannot be included
in a Rule 7 bond even though they are authorized by an underlying
statute. The court distinguished Marek on the ground that “Rule 68
. . . does not define costs, [but] Rule 39 does so in some detail.”206
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit in In re American
President Lines, Inc., a case decided only a few months after Marek,
held that the costs referred to in Rule 7 are simply those identified in
Rule 39.207 The court did not discuss Marek.208 In a later case,
however, the court did treat attorneys’ fees authorized by an underlying
statute as costs under Rule 39, and in that case it did cite Marek.209
Without squarely addressing the issue, the First Circuit in
Sckolnick v. Harlow affirmed a district court order requiring an
appeal bond that included attorneys’ fees because “the appeal might
be frivolous and . . . an award of sanctions against [the] plaintiff on
appeal was a real possibility.”210 The implication of the decision is
that costs under Rule 7 are not limited to the costs specified in Rule
39, but the additional costs need not be authorized by, and are not
limited to, those identified in an underlying statute. Narrowly read,
the case stands for the proposition that only attorneys’ fees may be
added to Rule 39 costs regardless of whether the fees are authorized
by a substantive statute and then only if the district court concludes
that the appeal is frivolous,211 though a broader reading would
expand the permissible costs beyond attorneys’ fees.212 Interestingly,
though the Ninth Circuit in Azizian held that a Rule 7 bond may
include attorneys’ fees, it held that a district court may not rely upon
205. No. 96-7312, 1997 WL 307777, at *1 (3d Cir. June 10, 1997).
206. Hirschensohn, 1997 WL 307777, at *2.
207. 779 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
208. A district judge in the Seventh Circuit noted that the circuits are split and that
the Seventh Circuit has not taken a position on the issue, but concluded that he need not
predict the circuit’s position because attorneys’ fees were not available under the applicable
statute. Walton v. City of Carmel, No. 1:05-cv-902-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL 2397683, at *3-4
(S.D. Ind. June 10, 2008).
209. See Montgomery & Assocs. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 816 F.2d 783,
784 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that attorneys’ fees authorized by an underlying statute were
costs recoverable under Rule 39 and therefore an application for them was subject to the
time limits specified by Rule 39).
210. 820 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1987).
211. See Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Adams, 656 F. Supp. 2d 240, 241-42 (D. Mass. 2009)
(noting that the First Circuit has not decided whether attorneys’ fees available under a
substantive statute may be included in an appeal bond but requiring appellant to post
a bond that apparently reflects attorneys’ fees because her appeal “bears the indicia
of frivolousness”).
212. See, e.g., In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. MDL
1361, 2003 WL 22417252, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 7, 2003) (holding that Skolnick authorizes the
inclusion in a Rule 7 bond of attorneys’ fees as well as the costs of delay and disruption of
settlement administration caused by a frivolous appeal).
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the court’s assessment that an appeal would be frivolous and
therefore include those fees in a Rule 7 bond.213 In any event, the
First Circuit later held that a Rule 7 bond may include attorneys’
fees if they are defined as costs by the underlying statute, but it
found no need to reconsider its position in Sckolnick that frivolity is an
independent basis for including attorneys’ fees in an appeal bond.214
Most of the cases addressing the proper scope of a Rule 7 bond do
so in the context of a request that a bond include appellate attorneys’
fees. These fees, as well as the costs identified in Rule 39, are part of
the costs that an extortionate appeal of a class settlement threaten to
impose. Another important kind of cost is the cost of delay in
implementing the settlement, especially the implicit interest lost on
the settlement funds while the appeal is pending.215 Delay costs
certainly cannot be included in an appeal bond in circuits that read
Rule 7 to be limited by Rule 39, for Rule 39 says nothing about these
costs.216 In circuits that look to the underlying statute, delay costs
could logically be included in an appeal bond if the underlying
statute authorizes the relevant party to recover such costs, just as
the bond may include attorneys’ fees if the statute authorizes their
recovery.217 In these circuits, some courts have held that if delay costs
are not authorized by the underlying statute, they cannot be
included;218 other courts have held that delay costs can be included

213. Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 960 (9th Cir. 2007).
214. See Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit, 420 F. App’x 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2011).
215. See, e.g., Cobell v. Salazar, No. CIV.A.96-01285(TFH), 2011 WL 4590776, at *1
(D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2011) (noting plaintiffs’ request that an appeal bond include over $3.1
million “for post-judgment interest”). Though delay costs usually relate to the time-use
value of the settlement fund, they can include marginal costs incurred in the
administration of the fund as a result of delay. See, e.g., id. (noting plaintiffs’ request that
an appeal bond include nearly $2.6 million “for the ‘increased cost of settlement
administration’ ”); In re Compact Disc, 2003 WL 22417252, at *1 (noting plaintiffs’
allegations of the settlement disruption costs that appeal would cause); In re NASDAQ
Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (reciting plaintiffs’
description of the administrative costs incurred when the processing of claims is
interrupted and restarted).
216. See, e.g., Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.),
No. Civ.A. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1665134, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2000) (concluding that delay
damages in the Third Circuit could be included only in a supersedeas bond and finding that
class counsel could request only a cost bond under Rule 7).
217. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (implying that appeal bond could include delay costs if authorized by underlying
statute but finding that relevant statute did not authorize them); In re AOL Time Warner,
Inc., Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Cv. 5575(SWK), 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
20, 2007) (same).
218. See, e.g., Cobell, 2011 WL 4590776, at *4 (rejecting request that delay costs be
included in appeal bond where underlying statute did not treat delay costs or attorneys’
fees as recoverable costs); In re Initial Pub. Offering, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 296-97; Fleury v.
Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21,
2008); In re AOL Time Warner, 2007 WL 2741033, at *4.
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anyway.219 Of course in the First Circuit, where a Rule 7 bond may
include costs incurred because of a frivolous appeal, the costs of delay
might qualify.220
Courts that have resisted the inclusion of delay costs in Rule 7
bonds emphasize the difference between Rule 7 bonds and
supersedeas bonds.221 A supersedeas bond is filed by the losing party
usually in the trial court and stays the execution of a judgment
pending appeal. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d), the
stay automatically takes effect when the district court approves the
bond.222 A motion for a stay and approval of a supersedeas bond may
also be made in the appellate court pursuant to Appellate Rule 8 if
moving first in the district court is impractical or the district court
denied the relief.223 A supersedeas bond ordinarily must be in the full
amount of the judgment and may include “ ‘damages for delay’
and . . . interest on the appeal.”224 Some courts apparently reason
that if delay damages are an element of supersedeas bonds, they
cannot be included in Rule 7 bonds, sometimes called “cost bonds,”225
which serve a different purpose; professional objectors do not seek to
post supersedeas bonds.226
219. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 1.09-MD-02036-JLK, 2012
WL 456691, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2012) (including in a bond interest to account for
“delay of distribution of funds to the class”); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 910986-CIV, 2006 WL 1132371, at *18 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2006) (including in a bond “interest
that the entire class will lose as a result of the appeal” apparently without explicit
statutory authority); In re NASDAQ, 187 F.R.D. at 128-29.
220. See Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. C.A. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71072, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (noting that “First Circuit case law indicates
that ‘costs,’ as contemplated in Rule 7, include the costs attendant to the delay associated
with an appeal” and including interest on a settlement for the expected duration of an
appeal where appeal was taken by professional objectors); In re Compact Disc, 2003 WL
22417252, at *1 (holding that Skolnick authorizes the inclusion in a Rule 7 bond of
“damages resulting from delay or disruption of settlement administration caused by a
frivolous appeal”).
221. There is no question that a Rule 7 bond differs from a supersedeas bond. See, e.g.,
Adsani v. Miller, 139 F.3d 67, 70 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that a supersedeas bond
and a Rule 7 bond “should not be confused”); In re Compact Disc, 2003 WL 22417252, at *1
(“[A Rule 7] bond is to be distinguished from a supersedeas bond. . . .”); 16A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3953, at 573 (4th ed. 2008) (“Rule 7
concerns giving a bond or other security for costs on appeal in a civil case. It should not be
confused with a supersedeas bond, which sometimes must be filed to obtain a stay of
execution of a judgment pending the appeal.”).
222. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d).
223. FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(2).
224. Omaha Hotel Co. v. Kountze, 107 U.S. 378, 388 (1883). See also In re NASDAQ,
187 F.R.D. at 128 (relying on Omaha Hotel for the proposition that damages for delay may
be included in a Rule 7 bond).
225. See Adsani, 139 F.3d at 70 n.2 (noting confusion in terminology and suggesting
that Rule 7 bond, “cost bond,” and “appeal bond” are synonyms and distinguishable from
“supersedeas bond”).
226. See, e.g., In re Enfamil Lipil Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 11-MD-02222,
2012 WL 1189763, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2012) (holding that delay costs could not be
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Of course, an appeal by a class settlement objector does not fit the
mold for which appellate supersedeas bonds were designed. The
objector is not liable under the district court’s judgment, and she is
not attempting to overturn a judgment against her in the appellate
court. In the usual situation, a defendant found liable below is
attempting to delay the execution of the judgment, and a supersedeas
bond is useful primarily to secure the judgment, lest circumstances
change during the pendency of the appeal that prevent the plaintiff
from collecting. Absent a stay of execution, the plaintiff could
immediately collect on the judgment, and the supersedeas bond is
required as a kind of quid pro quo for the stay.227 By contrast, the
delay in execution of a judgment approving a class settlement does
not arise because of entry of a judicial stay. After all, the defendants
have agreed to their liability under the settlement. Rather, the delay
during the pendency of the appeal arises because of the terms of the
settlement. The costs of delay during the pendency of appeal arise for
very different reasons in the supersedeas bond case and the class
settlement objection case, but the costs themselves are comparable.228
The idea that delay costs should be taken into account somehow in
cases where supersedeas bonds are irrelevant is easy to understand,
and the ready mechanism is the Rule 7 bond, even if that bond was
not intended to be used for that purpose.
Whatever elements may be included in a Rule 7 bond, courts have
considered the question of whether to require a bond to be separate

included in a bond sought only under Rule 7 where the settlement imposed delay costs on
the defendant); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Cv.
5575(SWK), 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007); Brown v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. CIV.A. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1665134,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2000). Not relying on the relationship to supersedeas bonds, one
district court reasoned that delay damages fall within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1912,
which allows an appellate court to award “the prevailing party just damages for his delay,
and single or double costs.” The statute thus distinguishes between “damages” and “costs,”
and Rule 7 contemplates only cost bonds. Section 1912 is often cited in tandem with
Federal Appellate Rule 38, and a Rule 7 bond does not encompass damages and penalties
awardable under Rule 38. See Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008
WL 4680033, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008).
227. One court explained, “It appears that a ‘supersedeas bond’ is retrospective
covering sums related to the merits of the underlying judgment (and stay of its execution),
whereas a ‘cost bond’ is prospective relating to the potential expenses of litigating an
appeal.” Adsani, 139 F.3d at 70 n.2. To the extent that a supersedeas bond can include the
costs of delay during the pendency of the appeal, however, it has a prospective component.
228. As one court aptly observed, frivolous appeals of a judgment approving a class
settlement are “tantamount to a stay” of the judgment. In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t
Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 786513, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8,
2010). See also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 1.09-MD-02036-JLK, 2012 WL
456691, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2012) (noting that the filing of an appeal by professional
objectors “prevents distribution of the Settlement proceeds [and] is an actual stay of
Judgment,” making a Rule 8 bond appropriate).
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from the question of the amount of the bond,229 though the need for a
bond is surely a function of the maximum amount of a bond. A
standard formulation is that in deciding whether to impose a Rule 7
bond, “courts typically consider[:] (1) the appellant’s financial ability
to post a bond; (2) the risk that the appellant would not pay
appellee’s costs if the appeal is unsuccessful[;] (3) the merits of the
appeal[;] and (4) whether the appellant has shown any bad faith or
vexatious conduct.”230 The first two considerations are related, for the
risk of nonpayment is a function of the individual’s wealth, and
wealth determines the person’s ability to post a bond. An inquiry into
the merits of the appeal is an inquiry into the probability that the
appeal will fail, which when multiplied by the costs that can be
assessed to a losing appellant equals the expected assessed costs of
the appeal. The probability of failure must be greater than fifty
percent, otherwise the district court would have reached the opposite
result.231 As the probability of failure increases, the expected costs
increase, and an extortionate appeal is assumed to be one with a high
probability of failure. If an inquiry into bad faith or vexatious conduct
has independent significance, it cannot mean merely that an appeal
has a low probability of success. In addition, in a circuit that
prohibits a district court from setting a Rule 7 bond to take into
account its judgment that an appeal is frivolous within the meaning
of Appellate Rule 38, the fourth consideration must relate to conduct
elsewhere in the litigation.
Courts have held that failure to post an appeal bond that a district
court orders is not a jurisdictional defect; rather, an appellate court
has discretion to dismiss an appeal when a bond is not posted or to
consider the merits of the appeal.232 Federal Rule of Appellate
229. See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner, 2007 WL 2741033, at *3 (“The question of
whether to impose an appeal bond is distinct from the issue of what costs the bond can and
should cover.”).
230. Gemelas v. Dannon Co., No. 1:08 CV 236, 2010 WL 3703811, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
31, 2010). See also Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 CV 10035(HB), 2011 WL
5873383, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011) (identifying same considerations); In re
Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2010 WL
5147222, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 13, 2010) (identifying same considerations); Fleury v.
Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21,
2008) (identifying same considerations); Chiaverini, Inc. v. Frenchie’s Fine Jewelry, Coins
& Stamps, Inc., No. 04-CV-74891-DT, 2008 WL 2415340, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2008)
(identifying same considerations); Baker v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., No. 01 CV. 5440 LAP,
2006 WL 3635392, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006) (identifying same considerations).
231. Cf. Blessing, 2011 WL 5873383, at *3 (“Naturally, this appeal in my view lacks
merit, a factor weighing in favor of requiring a bond.”).
232. See, e.g., Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 961-62 (9th Cir.
2007) (noting that “it is within [the appellate court’s] sound discretion to dismiss the
appeal” when an appellant has failed to pay an appeal bond and finding dismissal
inappropriate); Sams v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.),
391 F.3d 812, 815-16 (6th Cir. 2004) (observing that “[a]lthough failure to execute a bond
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Procedure 3(a)(2) supports this view, stating that “[a]n appellant’s
failure to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only
for the court of appeals to act as it considers appropriate, including
the dismissal of the appeal.”233
B. Proposed Approach
The above survey of existing law discloses three basic approaches
to appeal bonds: (1) a bond may include only costs identified in Rule
39 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920; (2) a bond may include these costs and any
costs to which the appellee would be entitled under an applicable
substantive statute; and (3) a bond may include all costs imposed by
a frivolous appeal. The first approach has the strongest legal
foundation. The most natural reading of the rules of appellate
procedure tie the costs that can be included in an appeal bond
required under Rule 7 to the costs that can be taxed under Rule 39,
and § 1920 costs can be included by authority of that statute. But
appeal bonds are most tightly constrained under this approach, and
as we explain below, the best method of addressing professional
objector extortion is through appeal bonds that include the full costs
of the appeal imposed on others, including appellate attorneys’ fees
and delay damages. The second approach offers greater promise, but
bonds of the necessary magnitude are not consistently available
under even this approach, for it is dependent on a wide array of
substantive statutes with different cost-shifting provisions, many of
which do not contemplate the imposition of full costs on a class
settlement objector.234 The third approach might permit the
systematic requirement of adequate bonds, but it has been adopted
by only one circuit, its contours are hazy, and it has the least
satisfying basis in existing law. We therefore propose a change in the
law as outlined below. We begin by laying out the elements of an
effective method of using appeal bonds to suppress professional
objectors, then provide refinements designed to avoid deterring
legitimate appeals. Finally, we offer specific proposed rule
amendments to implement our approach.
An appeal bond mechanism that effectively deters extortion will
have three components: (1) a nonnamed class settlement objector is
for costs on appeal has been generally considered as not being jurisdictional . . . failure to
execute such a bond unless exempted by law, is grounds for dismissal of the appeal” and
finding dismissal appropriate (quoting Powers v. Citizens Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.,
329 F.2d 507, 508-09 (6th Cir. 1964))).
233. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(2).
234. Cf. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing
variations in more than 100 fee-shifting statutes).
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liable for the full costs of an appeal imposed on others, including all
delay costs incurred by the class and class counsel and appellate
attorneys’ fees; (2) the objector must post a bond for the full costs of
appeal; and (3) the appellate court cannot hear an appeal on the
merits of the settlement or the bond requirement unless the bond is
posted. The first two components are complements. A bond secures
the amount for which the individual posting the bond will be liable in
the event liability attaches. A bond is needed in the case of a class
settlement objector regardless of the individual’s perceived ability to
pay the liability in part to avoid the cost of mistaken ability to pay
and in part to avoid the cost of collection. That collection cost would
itself be a source of potential extortion, albeit a limited one. The costs
of appeal accumulate during the pendency of appeal. If the objector
withdraws the appeal at some time after she files it, she would be
liable for all costs incurred by others up to that time. This amount
would be paid to the class and class counsel from the appeal bond.
The magnitude of the proposed liability and bond requires some
elaboration. The object of an appeal bond is to make class counsel
indifferent between defending an appeal and facing no appeal. Stated
otherwise, if an appeal will impose no cost on class counsel, the
payoff to class counsel in the noncooperative solution is zero. There is
no cooperative surplus in a single-period game, and class counsel will
not be willing to pay anything to rid themselves of an appeal that will
cost them nothing. Assume for now that an appeal has no chance of
success. If class counsel define their interests narrowly, without
regard to the welfare of the class, liability and a bond set at appellate
attorneys’ fees plus interest on the attorneys’ fees specified in the
settlement render class counsel impervious to extortion. A bond
routinely set in this amount would probably be sufficient to eliminate
most professional objector extortion. But delay will impose costs on
the class, certainly in the form of lost interest and perhaps in the
form of higher settlement administration costs.235 Class counsel who
235. If a settlement does not become effective until any appeals are concluded, an
appeal imposes a delay cost on the class and class counsel in the form of lost interest, and
it presumably imposes some lesser cost on the defendants, because the defendants do not
buy peace as quickly as they otherwise would but do obtain interest on the settlement
during the pendency of the appeal. If the parties anticipate the possibility of an appeal,
they may take account of the expected cost of the delay in the settlement amount. The
settlement amount would then represent a sharing of the loss caused by the appeal that
reflects the disparate impact of delay. Class counsel and the defendants cannot eliminate
the cost of an extortionate appeal by private agreement; they can merely allocate the loss
between them. If the class is then compensated by the appellant for the full cost of delay,
the class will be overcompensated. But the cost imposed on the appellant does not overdeter, because the excess compensation corresponds to the uncompensated loss incurred by
the defendants. If class counsel and the defendants anticipate that the class will be fully
compensated for any delay by the appellant, then the settlement amount would not reflect
any sharing of the loss from delay by the defendants. The Fifth Circuit’s assertion in this
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perceive their interests to be coincident with those of the class they
represent will incur the cost imposed on the class and to that extent a
bond based solely on attorneys’ fees will not adequately deter
extortion, even when an appeal has no chance of success. Moreover,
basing a bond on attorneys’ fees alone might suggest that the law
condones lawyers disregarding the interests of their clients in class
litigation, a suggestion that might exacerbate agency problems in
this context. To thwart extortion, therefore, the liability and bond
should be set at the full cost of appeals imposed on others. This
amount will include any appellate attorneys’ fees incurred by defense
counsel, for as long as an appeal would impose any costs on others,
there is room for extortion.
An extortionate appeal, however, is likely to have some probability
of success. For this reason, even if the full direct costs of appeal are
shifted ex ante to the professional objector through an appeal bond,
an appeal will probably impose some expected cost on class counsel;
and in a repeated-game setting, professional objectors may be able to
extort a settlement even if the expected monetary value of the appeal
to the objector is more than the expected monetary value to class
counsel. But the expected cost of a successful appeal is difficult to
estimate. If the appeal succeeds, at a minimum, the direct costs of
appeal will not be shifted to the objector. The appeal might result in
a mere redistribution of the settlement fund among class members. It
might result in an increase in the settlement fund. Attorneys’ fees for
past work might be unaffected, and class counsel might be
compensated for additional work necessary to revise the settlement.
But the appeal might instead result in a reduction in class counsel
compensation, either by reducing attorneys’ fees for completed work
or by requiring class counsel to perform unpaid work, and class
counsel will perceive their own reduced compensation as a cost of the
appeal even if it is offset exactly by an increase in class compensation.
The implication of an appeal having some probability of success is
that the imposition of the full direct costs of appeal on a losing
regard in Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 507 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam),
is perplexing. The court concluded that because the “settlement agreement makes no
provision for the payment of pre-judgment interest,” the parties “agreed that the financial
time-value of the benefits to be paid under the settlement is not to be awarded to the
plaintiffs,” and the interest on the settlement during the pendency of the appeal was not a
“cost” incurred by the class. The fact that a settlement agreement does not provide that the
class will be paid interest during the pendency of an appeal on its face suggests that an
appeal does injure the class, rather than that it does not. Perhaps the court means that the
parties contemplated appellate delay in setting the settlement amount, so that the class
was compensated ex ante. But contemplation of appellate delay means only that the cost of
delay was allocated between the parties, and the defendants may have agreed to shoulder
some of it. To refuse to impose the cost of delay on the appellant in such circumstances
externalizes the cost to the class and the defendants in some proportions.
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objector coupled with an appeal bond will not entirely eliminate the
possibility of extortion. It will, however, substantially reduce its
scope and probability. The expected cost of the appeal to class counsel
will be a fraction of what it would otherwise be, and the expected cost
of appeal is the upper bound on what class counsel would be willing
to pay to avoid an appeal. It establishes the limit on what the
objector can gain from extortion. Further, as the expected cost of the
appeal to the objector increases, the threat that the objector would
incur the cost as an investment in reputation becomes less credible.
The third component of an effective bond mechanism is that
unless the objector posts the bond required by the district court, the
appellate court cannot hear an appeal from a nonnamed class
member objector on the merits of the settlement or on any aspect of
the bond itself. If a professional objector can have any appeal relating
to the class settlement considered by the appellate court without
posting a bond, the bond requirement is toothless. The strategic
importance of an appeal to the objector is that it postpones the date
on which all litigation relating to the settlement is concluded, for the
conventional settlement does not permit implementation until that
date. If the appellate court hears an appeal challenging the
imposition of a bond requirement or the amount of the bond set when
the bond has not been filed, the objector has accomplished her
strategic objective just as surely as if the court considers the merits
of the settlement challenge without the posting of a bond. Anything
other than the appellate court’s summary dismissal of an appeal for
failure to post a bond opens the way for extortion, because otherwise
the objector could threaten to prolong the litigation by filing an
appeal, whether she is willing to wait for a resolution or plans to
withdraw the appeal prior to resolution.
Although implementing a restriction on hearing appeals absent
the posting of a bond would require a change in federal practice, the
change is not as radical as it might first appear. A major justification
for hearing appeals now absent the filing of a required bond is the
uncertainty in the law regarding the costs that may be included in a
Rule 7 bond.236 The first two components of a bond mechanism
sketched above would eliminate most of that uncertainty. What
would remain is uncertainty about the measurement of the full costs
of appeal imposed on others. An objector would generally not be able
to have an appellate court review the amount of the bond without
posting the bond. This is not a trivial constraint, but it serves a vital
purpose, and for reasons explored below the error costs should not be
236. For example, in one case the court considered an appeal even though the objector
had not posted a required bond in part because the objector argued, correctly in the court’s
view, that the amount of the bond was legally erroneous. Azizian, 499 F.3d at 962.
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high. An alternative would be to allow the appellate court routinely
to consider on an expedited basis an appeal limited to the bond
requirement or its amount. But the opportunity cost of considering
bond appeals out of turn is unacceptably high, just as is the
opportunity cost of considering the merits of the settlement challenge
out of turn.
A bond mechanism containing the components described above
would, therefore, greatly reduce though not eliminate the prospect of
extortionate appeals, and it would do so at low administrative costs.
A district court would have to determine the full costs of appeal, but
in most cases the calculation could be made based on the terms of the
settlement, readily available data on prevailing interest rates and
average duration of appeals in the relevant circuit, estimates of
appellate attorneys’ fees, and evidence of marginal settlement
administration costs. But requiring objectors to post properly
calculated appeal bonds has the potential to deter legitimate appeals.
To minimize this cost, we would permit the district court to reduce
the amount of the bond to as low as the costs now set out in Federal
Appellate Rule 39 and § 1920 when the judge determines that (1) the
appeal is legitimate and (2) a bond for the full amount would
effectively block the appeal. Correspondingly, if the appeal fails, the
objector would be liable only to the extent of the bond required. We
would implement this approach by establishing a presumption that a
full appeal bond with an associated liability will be imposed in every
case, allowing evidence of the appeal’s legitimacy and the objector’s
limited financial wherewithal to rebut the presumption.
A reduction in the presumptive bond amount would require the
necessary finding on both legitimacy and financial resources.
Allowing a reduction merely because of the appellant’s inability to
pay would have the effect of facilitating extortion by poor professional
objectors, or at least encouraging prosperous objectors to hide their
wealth. The legitimacy requirement is designed to screen out
extortionate appeals, and the limited financial capacity requirement
is designed to reduce the cost of errors in finding legitimacy by
imposing the full bond requirement on all appellants able to satisfy
it. The principal evidence on the legitimacy of the appeal would be
the district court’s assessment of the probability of success. A
legitimate appeal could certainly have a probability of success less
than fifty percent—if the judge estimated the probability at above
fifty percent, the judge would have erred in approving the settlement
by her own assessment. As the court’s estimate of the appeal’s
probability drops toward zero, the conclusion that the appeal is
illegitimate becomes more likely. In determining legitimacy, the
court would also be allowed to consider the quality of the briefs filed
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and argument made by the objector in the district court, the behavior
of the objector in the litigation, and the conduct of the objector in
other cases. All of this bears upon the legitimacy of the appeal, an
inquiry intended to identify appeals filed for the purpose of extortion.
Allowing an objector to avoid the normal bond requirement
creates a risk that the district court will mistakenly allow
professional objectors to appeal without posting the bond that is set
to quash extortion. This is an error of underinclusion, but it is a
manageable risk. The greater concern is that district courts will
impose prohibitive appeal bonds on legitimate objectors, an error of
overinclusion. Some argue that a large appeal bond required of any
objector will deter the appeal, thus insulating the district court’s
decision from review,237 and courts will have a tendency to impose the
bond requirement even on legitimate objectors to avoid appellate
scrutiny of their decisions. 238
Recognize first that a large appeal bond will not always deter an
appeal. The objector may post the bond. The expected liability
embodied in a bond is a function of the probability of the appeal’s
success. The more likely the appeal is to succeed, the less likely the
appellant will be held liable for appellate costs, and the more likely
the party will post the bond and appeal. Professional objectors are
likely to be deterred by the bond requirement, because they realize
that they have little chance of success on appeal. But if a district
court mistakenly believes that an appeal is illegitimate because
it has a low chance of success, the objector may post the bond
because of her assessment that the appeal has a much greater
probability of success.
A district court might want to suppress appeals of class settlement
approvals for two reasons. First, no judge wants to be reversed—
reversal typically represents a criticism of the judge’s work, and even
constructive criticism may be unwelcome. Second, the reversal of a
settlement approval will usually mean more work for the court, work
that may be particularly onerous. District courts are busy, and class
action litigation is often especially time consuming. If approval of a
class settlement ends the litigation, the court can go on to other
cases, but if the judgment is reversed, the court will be thrown back
into the case. A judge need not consciously decide to impose a bond
on a legitimate objector to thwart an appeal and thereby reduce the
237. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 507 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (noting that the imposition of a large appeal bond may “insulate a district court’s
judgment in approving a class settlement from appellate review”).
238. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 19, at 1656 (“[P]ermitting district courts to order
large Rule 7 bonds effectively allows them to decide whether their own rulings can be
challenged on appeal, and it is easy to [see] why they might over use this authority.”).
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chance of reversal. The judge may simply have a tendency to
construe ambiguous evidence in a way that justifies the imposition of
a bond.
A judge’s interest in suppressing class settlement appeals is clear,
but the strength of the tendency to pursue that interest by unduly
burdening legitimate objectors with large bond obligations is not. We
have no empirical proof that judges would be unbiased in appeal
bond determinations, but there is some reason for optimism. The
personal observations of one of the authors (Smith), who has spent
nearly twenty-five years in the federal judiciary on both the district
and circuit court levels, suggest that judges routinely try to do the
right thing. This is no more than anecdotal evidence, and it goes
more to negating the possibility that judges would deliberately
impose appeal bond requirements on legitimate objectors to impede
appeals than to negating the possibility that self-interest would
infect the judges’ analysis. But judges are not oblivious to the
benefits they might derive from an appeal bond that quashes an
appeal, and that recognition may induce judges committed to
reaching the correct result to examine their bond decisions carefully,
question their motivation, and err on the side of the objector. Indeed,
the tendency to give the objector the benefit of the doubt and thereby
facilitate extortionate appeals is one reason we propose establishing
a presumption that a bond for the full costs of appeal will be imposed
on all nonnamed class member objectors.
Further, district courts have resisted requests by class counsel to
impose appeal bond requirements on settlement objectors within the
limits recognized by circuit law in circumstances that easily could
have justified their imposition.239 In one case in the First Circuit, for
example, class counsel requested an appeal bond of $350,300, and the
court recognized that the attorney for the appellant had filed a
“groundless objection,” appeared to be “a repeat objector in class
action cases,” was proposing to file an appeal that “ ‘might be
frivolous,’ ” and faced “a real possibility” of sanctions on appeal.240
Circuit law permitted appeal bonds in an unlimited amount for
239. Of course the refusal to order a bond in the amount requested by class counsel
when the court believes that the amount requested includes legally impermissible costs
does not indicate that courts exercise discretion to maximize their own utility; they do not
perceive that they have discretion. See, e.g., Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-054525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, at *5, *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008) (refusing a request to
order a bond of more than $380,000 that included delay costs and setting the bond instead
at $5,000 where the court concluded that delay costs may not be included in a bond); In re
AOL Time Warner, Inc., Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Cv. 5575(SWK), 2007 WL 2741033,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007) (refusing a request to include in a bond the costs of delay in
administering a settlement where such costs were not authorized by law).
240. In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1361,
2003 WL 22417252, at *1, *2 & n.3 (D. Maine Oct. 7, 2003).
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frivolous appeals.241 But the court ordered a bond of $35,000,
explaining, “I am . . . mindful of the fact that objectors sometimes
serve a useful role in helping police class action settlements . . . . To
pose too high a hurdle for objectors, therefore, could create a general
deterrent that might well not comport with public policy.”242 In
another case, the court refused to require objectors to file any appeal
bond, despite evidence that “the objectors are represented by counsel
who specialize in objecting to class-action settlements” and had been
found to have “objected in bad faith” in other cases.243 The court
observed that “there are legitimate issues to pursue on appeal, and
for that reason I cannot say that the appeals are meritless.”244 The
court concluded, “[A]lthough it is possible that the objectors’ true
motives are to obstruct the settlement in the hopes of ‘getting paid to
go away,’ the evidence in the record does not enable me to find that any
objector is pursuing his or her appeal for an improper purpose.”245
Again, this evidence is no more than suggestive. An empirical
study we leave for another day would begin by comparing the
number of cases in which an appeal bond request was denied with
the number in which it was granted. But the evidence at least
demonstrates that judges sometimes refuse to exercise their
discretion to erect a bond barrier to appeal despite their knowledge
that an appeal carries a risk of reversal with its attendant costs for
the court.
Finally, district courts now are called upon to certify cases for
appellate review, and they do so despite recognizing that they could
reduce the probability of reversal and reduce the chances of adding to
their workload by denying certification. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a
district court may certify for interlocutory appeal an order that
involves “a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion.”246 The court must also
believe that an immediate appeal “may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation,”247 and so certification
ostensibly represents an act that would at worst leave the court’s
workload unaffected and at best reduce it. But certification
241. See Sckolnick v. Harlow, 820 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
242. See In re Compact Disc, 2003 WL 22417252, at *2.
243. In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., MDL No. 081999, 2010 WL 4630846, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2010).
244. Id.
245. Id. (citation omitted). See also In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices
Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 786513, at *1, *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2010)
(rejecting request to order multiple objectors to post appeal bonds ranging from $608,000 to
$2,286,000 where the appeals “are frivolous and are tantamount to a stay” of the judgment
approving the settlement and instead setting the bond for each at $500,000).
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
247. Id.
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nevertheless is an invitation by the district court for the appellate
court to reverse its decision, and in some circumstances reversal will
predictably prolong the litigation. For example, the court may
recognize that absent interlocutory appeal its order permitting the
litigation to continue will induce the parties to settle quickly,
whereas interlocutory appeal will prolong the litigation for at least
the duration of the appeal. Despite the potential adverse
consequences for the district court, courts do certify cases for
interlocutory review.248 Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), an
appeal may not be taken from the final order in habeas corpus
proceedings unless a circuit or district court judge issues a
“certificate of appealability”; the judge may not issue the certificate
unless the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right. The mechanism is designed to screen out
frivolous appeals.249 An appeal creates an opportunity for the
reviewing court to reverse the district court, and reversal has the
potential to increase the district court’s workload. Yet district courts
grant these certificates.250
One can think about an appeal bond mechanism as tantamount to
a relaxed certification procedure. If an appeal bond precludes appeal,
imposing it would have the same effect as would refusal to grant an
appeal certification necessary for appellate review. And one
alternative to a bond mechanism would be a requirement that
nonnamed class member objectors obtain from the district court a
certificate allowing appeal as a condition of appealing. Both a bond
mechanism and a certification procedure would vest primary
authority in the district court to police appeals. That is where the
authority must be vested if extortionate appeals are to be effectively
suppressed. Though that authority can be misused, the risk that
district judges will misuse that power is less serious than the risk
that professional objectors will continue to exploit their ability to
hijack class actions. But a bond mechanism is not in fact binary, and
a certification procedure is. A bond can be paid, and a court can
248. See 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3929,
at 363 (2d ed. 1996) (reporting that in the early years of the statute appellate courts
received applications in about 100 cases per year); Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing
Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1174-76 (1990)
(reporting numbers of cases certified for interlocutory appeal by district courts).
249. See, e.g., Sengenberger v. Townsend, 473 F.3d 914, 915 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing
the certificate of appealability requirement as “a mechanism . . . to monitor and
preclude the taking of frivolous appeals”); 16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3968.1, at 76-77 (4th ed. 2008) (“Courts have noted that
the COA requirement serves to protect the government from having to defend against
frivolous appeals.”).
250. See Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District
Courts 53 (2007) (reporting data on certificates of appealability in habeas cases granted by
federal district courts), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf.
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calibrate the amount of the bond to the harm that an appeal will do.
Also, the proposed bond mechanism is only an extension of time
honored appeal bond requirements. A certification procedure that by
its terms permits a district court to insulate its decision from
appellate review is not a mere extension of existing certification
procedures, but a fundamentally different procedural device. The
bond mechanism is preferable to a certification procedure even if the
two devices would usually achieve the same ends because it is more
supple and less radical.
Although district courts can generally be trusted to implement
appropriately the appeal bond mechanism described above, courts
undeniably would have substantial power. To prevent instances of
serious abuse, appellate courts could exercise their mandamus power
under the All Writs Act251 to override the district court’s decision by
ordering the court to rescind or lower a bond. Such an order, where
the bond is prohibitive and unjustified by the circumstances, would
surely be in aid of the appellate court’s jurisdiction.252 This is no more
than a last resort, for the appellate court can exercise its authority
only to remedy clear abuses of discretion by a lower court.253 But it
should be no more than that, because if a writ of mandamus were a
commonplace remedy, professional objectors could routinely seek it in
the appellate court thereby bypassing the bond device, which would
then fail to suppress extortion.254 A mandamus proceeding “must be
given preference over ordinary civil cases,”255 and the extraordinary
showing necessary for a writ of mandamus would allow the appellate
court to dismiss on motion unexceptional petitions by professional
objectors, blunting any value the petition would have as a basis
of extortion.
C. Rule Revisions
Implementing the appeal bond approach described above would
require changes in the law, but they would not be difficult to make.
251. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
252. See WRIGHT, supra note 248, § 3932, at 473 (“The most fundamental condition
imposed on issuance of the extraordinary writs by the courts of appeals is that they be in
aid of jurisdiction.”).
253. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1989) (recognizing that
extraordinary remedy of mandamus may be used by appellate court to address clear abuse
of discretion by district court); see also MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL
APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE § 3.02, at 188 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that the
Supreme Court has often stated that mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy”).
254. Cf. In re Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C., 973 F.2d 1133, 1135 (4th Cir. 1992) (“The
very power of the writ of mandamus demands that its availability be limited to narrow
circumstances lest it quickly become a shortcut by which disappointed litigants might
circumvent the requirements of appellate procedure mandated by Congress.”).
255. FED. R. APP. P. 21(b)(6).
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The necessary revisions could be accomplished in a number of ways,
but the simplest approach would be to amend the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Here, we set out three changes that would
establish an effective bond mechanism. Our interest is in the
substance of the proposed provisions, not the precise language; more
elegant and technically precise amendments are no doubt possible.
x Amend Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 to add the
following subdivision (f): “Notwithstanding other subdivisions
of this rule, whenever a nonnamed member of a class certified
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 appeals a judgment
approving a settlement of the class action and the judgment is
affirmed, the appellate court will tax the appellant the full costs
of appeal imposed on others, including all costs of delay,
attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the appeal, and costs
described in subdivision (e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, unless the
court finds that appellant raised substantial issues of law and
did not appeal primarily to obtain a payment for withdrawing
the appeal. If the court so finds, it will tax appellant the costs
specified in subdivision (e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920.”
x Amend Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 7 to add the
following subdivision: “Whenever a nonnamed member of a
class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 appeals
a judgment approving a settlement of the class action, the
district court will require the appellant to file a bond in the
amount of the expected costs specified in Rule 39(f) unless the
court finds that (1) appellant raises substantial issues of law
and does not appeal primarily to obtain a payment for
withdrawing the appeal and (2) appellant would be financially
unable to file a bond in that amount. If the court so finds, the
court will impose a bond in whatever amount it deems
necessary to protect the interests of the class, but in no event
will the bond be less than the costs specified in Rule 39(e) and
28 U.S.C. § 1920.”
xAmend Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 to add the
following subdivision: “A court of appeals may not hear an
appeal brought by a nonnamed member of a class certified
under Federal Rule of Procedure 23 seeking review of a
judgment approving a settlement of the class action, an order
under Rule 7 requiring the appellant to file a bond, or the
amount of such a bond unless the appellant has filed any bond
required by the district court under Rule 7.”
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V. CONCLUSION
The business of professional objectors is to make insubstantial
objections to class settlements on behalf of nonnamed class members,
then threaten to appeal the judgment approving the settlement
unless paid to desist. The business is extortion, and it is profitable
because class counsel have a powerful incentive to avoid the costs
that an appeal would impose. Any payment represents a tax on class
settlements, a tax that is imposed indiscriminately on class
settlements and burdens the productive use of class litigation.
Class settlements, however, can be cozy deals that benefit class
counsel and defendants at the expense of class members, and
appellate review can be an important method of protecting the
interests of the class. The policy objective is to suppress extortionate
appeals without deterring valuable appeals, and to achieve the result
at tolerable administrative costs. It is difficult to achieve. Various
approaches have been tried or proposed, and none is perfect. We
propose a system under which the district court that approves a
settlement would presumptively impose an appeal bond requirement
on nonnamed class member objectors for the full costs of appeal,
including appellate attorneys’ fees and delay costs, and such an
appellant would be liable for those costs in the event the appeal fails.
The presumption could be rebutted and the bond reduced by
demonstrating to the district court’s satisfaction that the appeal is
legitimate and that the appellant is financially unable to post the full
bond. The appellate court would generally be prohibited from
considering an appeal unless the bond is posted.
Our approach is not perfect. It may not suppress all extortionate
appeals, and it may suppress some legitimate ones. But we believe it
offers greater promise of maximizing net benefits than any other
approach. What is abundantly clear is that no method yet
implemented has squelched this kind of extortion. Professional
objectors continue to ply their trade. The time is right for a new
approach, however imperfect.
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